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TITLE, POINTS AND LINES IN LAKES AND STREAMS
By EDWARD S. BADE*
T HE diversity of the law of the several states with reference
to the nature and extent of riparian' rights and privileges
and the nature and extent of title in the beds of waters, makes it
impossible to do more than consider the problems of one state
in the confines of an article. Hence, the following discussion is
confined almost entirely to the problems met in Minnesota. If,
however, allowance is made for existing differences in the applic-
able law, it is believed that the discussion of Minnesota problems
will be at least suggestive if not helpful elsewhere. In Minne-
sota, the woodsman's axe, the pioneer's plow, much ill-advised
drainage, and prolonged and recurring droughts have permanent-
ly reduced or destroyed streams and lakes.- The receding waters
have left behind them boundary line problems to trouble abutting
owners, surveyors, and the courts.
The late Mr. Rome G. Brown sought to answer some of these
problems in an address delivered before the Minnesota Surveyors'
and Engineers' Society.3 He laid down the following proposi-
tions: In the case of private or non-navigable streams, the thread
of the stream is the boundary between opposite riparians unless
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1The term "riparian" will be used herein to signify rights and privileges
in lakes as well as streams, though the term "littoral" is more precisely
applicable to lakes.
2As early as 1903, the Minnesota supreme court took judicial notice
of the fact that our lakes and streams were receding and even disappearing.
Hanson v. Rice, (1903) 88 Minn. 273, 92 N. W. 982. The process has
continued since and is still in operation.
3Published in a pamphlet entitled Points and Lines on Lakes and
Streams (1908).
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some other boundary has been fixed in the conveyances under
which they hold. The lateral boundaries in the stream are formed
by extending a line from the intersection of the upland side line
boundary with the shore line of the stream at the medium stage
of water, at right angles to the thread of the stream. 4 In the case
of a round lake, the lateral lines in the bed are run from the inter-
section of the upland side lines with the meander line, if there be
one, and if none, then from the intersection of these side lines
with the shore, to the geographical center of the lake. If the lake
is irregular, one must combine as best one can the method used
in the case of streams. The method used in round lakes is applied
at the ends and in the larger bays and coves. The stream method
is applied through the body of the lake, a "thread of the stream"
being found along the geographical center of the body of the lake.
The lateral side lines in the bed are projected into the lake at
right angles to this "thread of the stream" as in the case of
streams. If the waters in question are private or non-navigable,
the lines thus run delimit the riparian owner's land in the stream
or lake bed. If the waters are public or navigable, he will follow
the receding waters between the lateral lines so run to the thread
of the stream or center. No doubt this brief r6sum6 is an over-
simplification of Mr. Brown's over-simplification of the problems
involved. It is not so simple a matter. We shall now see how
far these propositions can be supported.
A discussion of the problems involved necessitates a definition
of terms and consideration* of their legal significance. Among
the more important terms are meander lines, thread of the stream,
point or line of navigability, high water mark, and public and
private waters.
Meander lines are not per se boundary lines, and were not
so intended. They are a series of straight lines, roughly blocking
out the sinuosities of the banks of larger bodies of waters and
streams, and were run for the purpose of computing the area of
lands bounded on such waters. Unrestricted patents and deeds of
fractional sections and government lots make the meandered
waters a boundary unless the description limits the conveyance
to the meander or some other line. In other words, a meander
line may be made a boundary line, though it was not run for that
purpose, and though it normally does not function as a boundary
line. These propositions were laid down in an early Minnesota
4What is meant by "thread of the stream" will appear post.
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case,5 which went to the United States Supreme Court," where
the law on that point was settled.7
The term "thread of the stream" means the geographical
center of the stream at ordinary or medium stage of the water,
disregarding slight and exceptional irregularities in the banks. It
is fixed without regard to the main channel of the stream; that
is, the greater volume of water may flow and the greater depth
of water may lie on one side or other of the thread of the stream.8
The thread of the stream in private boundaries is to be dis-
tinguished from the thalweg which is variously described as the
thread or center of the main channel, the middle of the navigable
channel, the middle or deepest or most navigable channel, the
track taken by boats in their course down the stream, and other
variants of the same tenor." The thalweg is commonly used as
5Schurmeier v. St. Paul and Pacific R. Co., (1865) 10 Minn. 82(Gil. 59), 88 Am. Dec. 59.
"Railroad Company v. Schurmeier, (1868) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 272, 19
L. Ed. 74. The court said at p. 286: "Meander lines are run in surveying
fractional portions of the public lands bordering upon navigable rivers, not
as boundaries of the tract, but for the purpose of defining the sinuosities of
the banks of the stream, and as the means of ascertaining the quantity of the
land in the fraction subject to sale, and which is to be paid for by the
purchaser . . . the water course, and not the meander-line, is the boundary."7The current regulations governing meandering may be found in the
Manual of Instructions for the Survey of the Public Lands of the United
States, 1930 Ed., secs. 226 et seq. This manual will hereafter be cited as
"Manual of Instructions, 1930 Ed."
Every plat and survey and patents or conveyances made with reference
thereto must be interpreted with reference to the instructions under which
the survey and plat was made. Prior to 1855, surveys were made under
local or special instructions. In 1855, the first manual of instructions of
general application was issued. The Public Domain (1880) 182. This
general manual has been revised several times. See Clark, Surveying and
Boundaries (2d ed. 1939) secs. 38, 338. Even after general manuals of
instruction had been issued, many surveys were made under special instruc-
tions. Little thought seems to have been given to the preservation of
these instructions. Apparently no department of the United States govern-
ment has a complete file of the special instructions and general manuals of
instructions. The writer is informed that the Minnesota State Historical
Society Library in St. Paul, Minnesota has a copy of the 1855 and 1876
manuals, and also of some special instructions.
sJudicial definitions of "thread of the stream" may be found in the
following cases:
Dayton v. Cooper Hydraulic Co., (1900) 10 Ohio Superior & C. B.
Dec. 192, 205, 7 Ohio N. P. 495; Warren v. Thomaston, (1883) 75 Me. 329,
46 Am. Rep. 397; State v. Muncie Pulp Co., (1907) 119 Tenn. 47, 104
S. "W. 437; Branham v. Bledsoe Creek Turnpike Co., (1878) 1 Lea (Tenn.)
704, 27 Am. Rep. 789; Trustees of Hopkins Academy v. Dickinson, (1852) 9
Cush. (Mass.) 544.
Presumably it was in this sense that our court used the term in
Pinney v. Luce, (1890) 44 Minn. 367, 46 N. W. 561.
9Iowa v. Illinois, (1893) 147 U. S. 1. 13 Sup. Ct. 239, 37 L. Ed. 55;
Louisiana v. Mississippi, (1906) 202 U. S. 1, 26 Sup. Ct. 408, 50 L. Ed.
913; Minnesota v. Wisconsin, (1920) 252 U. S. 273, 40 Sup. Ct. 313, 64
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marking international and interstate water boundaries, but, of
course, not invariably. Private boundaries will commonly coin-
cide with state and national boundaries, though again, this is not
necessarily so. 10 Where private boundaries coincide with state
or national boundaries on navigable waters, the thalweg, if that
is the national or state boundary, rather than the thread of the
stream, will mark the private boundary. Local law as to the
ownership of the bed of navigable or public waters may limit the
private boundary to high or low water mark."
The division of waters into private and public waters" is a
pervasive and troublesome factor in the problem of boundaries.
An ancient recipe for rabbit stew began with the direction to
"First catch your rabbit." Here we must begin with a similar
platitude: Boundary lines do not determine ownership, but title
or ownership determines the locus of boundary lines. The latter
mark the ambit of title, once title is determined. Hence it be-
comes necessary to determine the nature and extent of riparian
ownership on waters.
State and federal definitions of public or navigable waters may
or may not be-the same. The Minnesota definition of public
waters and the federal definition of navigable waters are not
equally comprehensive. In Minnesota the idea underlying the
definition of public waters is navigability, but it goes beyond that
concept. In the case of State v. Lamprey3 the concept of
navigability is not limited to commercial navigation, but is stated
to include boating and sailing for pleasure. It is further stated
that the term "navigable" should be given a sufficiently extended
meaning to preserve and protect the rights of the people to all
L. Ed. 558; Arkansas v. Tennessee, (1918) 246 U. S. 158, 38 Sup. Ct. 301,
62 L. Ed. 638. L. R. A. 1918D 258; New Jersey v. Delaware, (1934) 291
U. S. 361, 54 Sup. Ct. 407, 78 L. Ed. 847. A plat delineating the boundaries
in the case last cited will be found in 295 U. S. opp. p. 701, 55 Sup. Ct.
909, 79 L. Ed. 1662.10See New Jersey v. Delaware, (1934) 291 U. S. 361, 54 Sup. Ct.
407, 78 L. Ed. 847, where private boundaries evidently extended across the
state boundary at some points. In this case also the thalweg did not
constitute the entire interstate boundary.
"Barnev v. Keokuk, (1876) 94 U. S. 324, 24 L. Ed. 224; Shively v.
Bowlby, (1894) 152 U. S. 1, 14 Sup. Ct. 548, 38 L. Ed. 331; Borax Consoli-
dated, Ltd., v. Los Angeles, (1935) 296 U. S. 10, 56 Sup. Ct. 23. 80 L. Ed. 9;
Hardin v. Jordan, (1891) 140 U. S. 371, 11 Sup. Ct. 808, 35 L. Ed. 428
(dictum).
"2These terms are more descriptive of the classification under Minnesota
state law: non-navigable and navigable are more descriptive of the federal
classification. Public waters means navigable waters.
13(1893) 52 Minn. 181, 53 N. "ff. 1139, 18 L. R. A. 670, 38 Am. St.
Rep. 541.
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beneficial public uses of which the waters are capable. This defi-
nition of navigable or public -waters is broader than that obtain-
ing in many states. All waters not coming within the definition
of public or navigable waters are private or non-navigable. 14
If a conveyance bounds land on or by a private stream or
lake, according to the common law which is followed in Minne-
sota, prima facie the grant will include the bed to the thread of
the stream or center of the lake, if the grantor owns so far.:"
The beds of private waters are the subject of absolute ownership
in precisely the same way as upland is the subject of absolute own-
ership.1
.But riparian owners on public waters under the Minnesota
rule own absolutely only to ordinary high water mark. They have
a qualified title between ordinary high water mark and low water
mark, subject to certain undefined rights in the public to use that
space in connection with public uses of the public waters. 7  Be-
yond the low water line, the state of Minnesota is said to own the
beds of public lakes and streams "in trust" for the general pub-
lic.' While Minnesota cases are to the effect that the state has
no jus privatum in the bed-nothing it can alienate-its "trust"
ownership does give it the power to maintain, improve, and pre-
serve the use of public waters for the general public.19 While the
riparian owner does not have title to the bed under public waters
below low water mark, he does have an exclusive right or
privilege to construct and maintain suitable landings, piers, and
wharves into the water up to the point of navigability, for his
own private use and benefit. It is said that it is obviously im-
material, if the public interests are not prejudiced, whether the
submerged lands be covered with wharves of timber or stone,
or be reclaimed from the water by filling in with earth so that it
- For the federal definition see post.
"Minnesota cases are collected in 1 Dunnell's Dig. (2d ed., 1927) secs.
1067, 1068. An extensive note on the point will be found in 74 A. L. R. 597.
-°Lamprey v. Danz, (1902) 86 Minn. 317, 90 N. W. 578; Shell v.
Matteson, (1900) 81 Minn. 38, 83 N. W. 491.
"In re Minnetonka Lake Improvement, (1894) 56 Minn. 513, 58
N. W. 295, 45 Am. St. Rep. 494; State v. Korrer, (1914) 127 Minn. 60,
148 N. WV. 617, 1095, L. R. A. 1916C 139.
'sThe origin of this "trust" theory and its significance and the absurd
results to which it has carried our court, are fully discussed in Fraser,
Title to the Soil Under Public Waters-a Question of Fact, (1918) 2
MINNESOTA LAW REviEW 313-339, Fraser. The Trust Theory, (1918) 2
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 429-447. Cf. Hallam, Rights in Soil and Mineral
Under Water, (1917) 1 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 34-47.
'9See articles cited in note 18 supra; State v. Korrer, (1914) 127
Minn. 60, 148 N. W. 617, 1095, L. R. A. 1916C 139. :,
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becomes dry land. Subject to the power of the state, the riparian
owner may so reclaim the bed. This private right of use and en-
joyment is not limited to purposes connected with the use of
navigable waters, but may extend to any purpose not inconsistent
with the public right. No one but the riparian proprietor has the
right or privilege to improve and occupy such premises for private
purposes. The limit of this riparian privilege is imposed by the
public right and exists up to the point beyond which it would be
inconsistent with the public right. 20  Furthermore, it has been de-
cided in Minnesota that this riparian privilege of improvement,
reclamation, and occupancy, can be dissociated from the land
constituting the original shore and can be transferred apart from
the original shore lands. The methods or means of access to "the
sphere of reclamatory action is said to be immaterial.2'
But the determination of title in navigable waters is not wholly
dependent on Minnesota law. The federal definition of navigable
waters also has effect on title in all states created out of the United
States public domain. The federal definition of navigability
divides navigable waters into navigable waters of the United
States and navigable waters of the several states.22 According
to the cases cited, navigable waters of either class are such as are
used or capable of being used, in their ordinary condition, as
highways of commerce, over which trade and travel are or may
be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.
Capacity of such use by the public for purposes of transportation
and commerce affords the true criterion of navigability. The mode
by which commerce is or may be conducted is not the true test
under the federal rule. The waters need not be capable of use
by steam or sailing vessels. On the other hand the fact that "a
fishing skiff or gunning canoe" can be made to float at high water
is not enough. The fact that there are occasional difficulties such
as bars, falls, or rapids, which may be removed or circumvented
does not render the stream non-navigable, nor is it necessary that
20The text here is substantially a quotation from the second opinion
in Hanford v. St. Paul & Duluth R. Co., (1890) 4S Minn. 104, 110, 42
N. W. 596, 44 N. W. 1144, 7 L. R. A. 722.21Hanford v. St. Paul & Duluth R. Co., (1890) 43 Minn. 104, 42
N. W. 596, 44 N. W. 1144, 7 L. R. A. 722; Union Depot, etc., Co. v.
Brunswick, (1883) 31 Minn. 297, 17 N. W. 626, 47 Am. Rep. 789; Brad-
shaw v. Duluth Imperial Mill Co., (1892) 52 Minn. 59, 53 N. W. 1066.22The Daniel Ball v. United States, (1870) 10 Wall. (U.S.) 557, 19 L.
Ed. 999; The Montello, (1871) 11 Vall. (U.S.) 411, 20 L. Ed. 191, (1874)
20 Wall. (U.S.) 430, 22 L. Ed. 391; The Robert W. Parsons, (1903) 191
U. S. 17, 24 Sup. Ct. 8, 48 L. Ed. 73; United States v. Utah, (1931) 283
U. S. 64, 51 Sup. Ct. 438, 75 L. Ed. 844.
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it be navigable at all seasons or all stages of water or over the
entire bed. The controlling consideration under the federal defi-
nition is navigability in fact for travel, trade, or commerce. If
the waters are thus navigable between different points in a state,
they are navigable waters of that state. If thus navigable for
travel, trade, or commerce between states, or between states and
foreign countries, they are navigable waters of the United States.3
Is the federal or state test of navigability applied in deter-
mining the navigability of waters wholly within a state and not
coming within the classification of navigable waters of the United
States? Because the state and federal tests differ, it will be seen
that the answer to this question affects, not only the rights of the
public in the waters in question, but also title. An answer may
best be sought by beginning at the beginning. In the states
formed out of the United States public domain, the United States
originally had "the entire dominion and sovereignty, national and
municipal, federal and state, over all the territories, so long as they
remained in a territorial condition" and had power to make grants
of this public domain, including lands under water, navigable or
non-navigable, as it saw fit.2 4 Its policy was not to convey away
lands under navigable waters and it seldom did so.2 1 States or-
ganized in this public domain, upon admission to the Union, be-
came vested with title to the beds of all waters then navigable " if
not previously granted by the United States, 27 subject, however, to
the paramount power of the United States over such waters in
virtue of its power over interstate and foreign commerce, and
perhaps its admiralty jurisdiction.28
-If such waters are connected by carrying places or portages, they
may thereby be navigable waters of the United States. Economy Light &
Power Co. v. United States, (1921) 256 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. 409, 65 L.
Ed. 847.
"'Shively v. Bowlby, (1894) 152 U. S. 1, 48, 14 Sup. Ct. 548, 38 L.
Ed. 331; Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, (1922) 260 U. S.
77, 43 Sup. Ct. 60, 67 L. Ed. 140.
-'Shively v. Bowlby, (1894) 152 U. S. 1, 14 Sup. Ct. 548, 38 L. Ed.
331; United States v. Holt State Bank, (1926) 270 U. S. 49, 46 Sup. Ct. 197,
70 L. Ed. 465.
-Pollard v. Hagan, (1845) 3 How. (U.S.) 212, 11 L. Ed. 565;
United States v. Utah, (1931) 283 U. S. 64, 51 Sup. Ct. 438, 75 L. Ed.
8-44; United States v. Oregon, (1935) 295 U. S. 1, 55 Sup. Ct. 610, 79
L. Ed. 1267; United States v. Holt State Bank, (1926) 270 U. S. 49, 46
Sup. Ct. 197, 70 L. Ed. 465.
In Minnesota the date as of which the question is to be determined is
May 11, 1858.27Shively v. Bowlby, (1894) 152 U. S. 1, 14 Sup. Ct. 548, 38 L. Ed.
331; United States v. Holt State Bank, (1926) 270 U. S. 49, 46 Sup. Ct.
197, 70 I.. Ed. 465.
28Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, (1921) 256 U. S.
113, 41 Sup. Ct. 409, 65 L. Ed. 847.
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When Minnesota was admitted to the Union (and so of the
other states organized in the public domain), the United States
retained title to vast areas of lands, abutting on waters navigable
and non-navigable, some of which it still retains, and much of
which it has since disposed of. Other lands, riparian on navigable
and non-navigable waters, had previously been granted to settlers.
As to lands retained by the United States, it has at least the same
rights and powers as any individual proprietor. As to grants or
patents made by the United States to individual grantees, some
-confusion and misapprehension has resulted from the statement
that their construction and effect depended on the local law of the
state in which the granted land is situated. Chief source of this
confusion is probably the case of Hardin v. Jordan,2 which con-
cerned the effect of patents of land in Illinois abutting on a lake
which extended into Indiana. The United States surveys labelled
the lake as navigable, but the lower courts had found it to be
non-navigable. This finding was not questioned by the United
States Supreme Court. The question before the court then was
this: Does a patent or grant of lands bounded on a meandered non-
navigable lake give the patentee title to the bed to the center of
the lake ?3o The court said:
"This question must be decided by some rule of law, and no
- rule of law can be resorted to for the purpose except the local
law of the state of Illinois."
The court said further:
"In our judgment the grants of the government for lands
bounded on streams and other waters, without any reservation or
restriction of terms, are to be construed as to their effect accord-
ing to the law of the state in which the lands lie."
And before that in the same opinion, in speaking of the power of
the states to regulate and control the shores and beds of navigable
waters, the court said:
"but it depends on the law of each state to what waters and
to what extent this prerogative of the state over the lands under
water shall be exercised."'"
In 1913, more than thirty years later, the United States Supreme
'Coprt voiced the same view in this language:
"But it results from the principles already referred to that
what shall be deemed a navigable water within the meaning of the
2D(1891) 140 U. S. 371, 11 Sup. Ct. 808, 35 L. Ed. 428.
3 0The prevailing opinion contains as much dictum as decision.3 tThe quotations are from pp. 380, 384, and 382 respectively. The
italics are added.
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local rules of property is for the determination of the several
states.' *2
As late as 1922, the United States Supreme Court said:
"Some states have sought to retain title to the beds of streams
by recognizing them as navigable when they are not actually so.
It seems to be a convenient method of preserving their control.
No one can object to it unless it is sought thereby to conclude one
whose right to the bed of the river, granted and vesting before
statehood, depends for its validity on non-navigability of the
stream in fact. In such a case, navigability vel non is not a
local question." 33
It then purported to distinguish Wear v. Kansas,3 4 and the
Donnelly Case.
These expressions, together with many other general state-
ments that unrestricted grants by the United States are to be
construed with reference to local property law, certainly furnished
a basis for the view that navigability vel non was a local question,
a view advanced in recent cases, now to be considered.
In the Brewer-Elliott Case36 the state of Oklahoma claimed
that by its legislative declaration, and by its own court decisions,
the waters in question were navigable; but it was held they did
not conclude the United States and that they could have no effect
on United States grants made before Oklahoma was admitted to
the Union. So in Economy Light & Power Co. v. United
States$ 7 and in Oklahoma v. Texaes the United States Supreme
Court refused to be bound by a state determination of non-
navigability or navigability. If any doubt remained that- the
United States Supreme Court had changed its views as to the
law applicable to the determination of navigability vel non,
United States v. Holt State Bank3" dispelled it. In this case the
lower courts had applied the state test of navigability. Of this
the Supreme Court said:
"We think they applied a wrong standard. Navigability, when
asserted as the basis of a right arising under the Constitution of
32Donnelly v. United States, (1913) 228 U. S. 243, 33 Sup. Ct. 449,
57 L. Ed. 820, Ann. Cas. 1913E 710.
This language may lose some force by the subsequent modification of
the opinion, in 228 U. S. 708, 33 Sup. Ct. 1024, 57 L. Ed. '1035.
aBrewer-Elliott Oil & Gas -Co. v. United States, (1922) 260 U. S_
77, 89, 43 Sup. Ct. 60, 67 L. Ed. 140.'
-4(1917) 245 U. S. 154, 38 Sup. Ct. 55, 62 L. Ed. 214.
3Supra, note 32.
3tBrewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, (1922) 260 U. S.
77, 43 Sup. Ct. 60, 67 L. Ed. 140.
37(1921) 256 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. 409, 65 L. Ed. 847.
38(1922) 258 U. S. 574, 42 Sup. Ct. 406, 66 L. Ed. 771.
3(1926) 270 U. S. 49, 46 Sup. Ct. 197, 70 L. Ed. 465.
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the United States, is necessarily a question of federal law to be
determined according to the general rule recognized and applied
in the federal courts. To treat the question as turning on the
varying local rules would give the constitution a diversified
operation where uniformity was intended."
It should be noted that the lands abutting on this lake were
granted by the United States after Minnesota was admitted to
the Union. In United States v. Utah,40 the state had title to the
lands in question if the underlying waters were navigable waters
at the date of its admission to the Union. If non-navigable, title
was in the United States. Of the issue thus before the court, it
said:
"The question of navigability is thus determinative of the
controversy, and that is a federal question. This is so, although
it is undisputed that none of the portions of the rivers under
consideration constitute navigable waters of the United States,
that is, they are not navigable in interstate or foreign commerce,
and the question is whether they are navigable waters of the state
of Utah. State laws cannot affect titles vested in the United
States."
4 1
In United States v. Oregon,42 title to 81,786 acres of land lying
within the meander lines of certain shallow waters was in issue.
The several propositions advanced by the state and the court's dis-
position thereof deserve detailed treatment. First the state claimed
title to these lands on the ground that the waters were navigable
at the date of its admission to the Union. This claim was ad-
vanced as an independent question of fact, and also on the basis
of an act of the legislature declaring all meandered waters navig-
able and vesting the bed of such waters in the state. The court
held the state's title to depend on navigability vel non at the date
of its admission to the union determined as a question of fact
under the federal test of navigability, saying:
"Since the effect upon the title to such lands is the result of
federal action in admitting a state to the Union, the question,
whether the waters within the State under which the lands lie
are navigable or non-navigable, is a federal, not a local one. It
is, therefore, to be determined according to the law and usages
recognized and applied in the federal courts, even though, as
in the present case, the waters are not capable of use for naviga-
tion in interstate or foreign commerce."
The state's second contention on the point of title ran thus:
40(1931) 283 U. S. 64, 51 Sup. Ct. 438, 75 L. Ed. 844.
41The court cites Brewer-Elliot Oil & Gas Co. v. United States and
United States v, Holt State Bank. The reference to "state laws" is to a
legislative declaration of navigability of waters in question.
42(1935) 295 U. S. 1, 55 Sup. Ct. 610, 79 L. Ed. 1267.
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After statehood, local law controls the disposition of title to land
retained by the United States underlying non-navigable waters
within the state, and hence the effect of conveyances of adjacent
upland by the United States is determined with reference to
state law. By state law, the conveyance of adjacent upland
limited the grant to the meander line, and the land within the
meander line vested in the state. The substance of the court's
answer was: That the disposition of such lands is a matter of the
intention of the United States. If it has not otherwise shown its
intention, it may be taken to have assented that the grant should
be construed and given effect according to the law of the state in
which the land lies. That the court had never held that a
state could deprive the United States of its title to the beds of
non-navigable waters or that a grant of upland to an individual
which did not by implication include the adjacent land under
such waters nevertheless operated to convey the latter lands to
the state. The court continued:
"The laws of the United States alone control the disposition
of title to its lands. The states are powerless to place any limita-
tion or restriction on that control [citing cases]. The construction
of grants by the United States is a federal not a state question
[citing cases], and involves the consideration of state questions
only insofar as it may be determined as a matter of federal law
that the United States has impliedly adopted and assented to a
state rule of construction as applicable to its conveyances [citing
cases]. In construing a conveyance by the United States of
land within a state, the settled and reasonable rule of construction
of the state affords an obvious guide in determining what impliedly
passes to the grantee as an incident to land expressly granted. But
no such question is presented here, for there is no basis for
implying any intention to convey title to the state."
The court characterized the state's claim on this ground as:
"not one of the reasonable construction of grants of the United
States, but the attempted forfeiture to the state by legisla-
tive fiat of land which, so far as they have not passed to the
individual upland proprietors, remain the property of the United
States."
It may be noted that while the waters in issue in the Holt
Bank Case were found to be navigable waters of the United States,
in the Utah and Oregon cases the court makes the federal test
of navigability applicable to navigable waters of the states and
of the United States. In the latter case, Oregon pointedly raised
the issue in respect to land-locked lakes wholly within the state.
Addressing itself to the question of navigability in fact48 it said:-
43pp. 16 and 17 of its brief to the United States Supreme Court.
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"But one of the purposes of the present litigation between the
United States and the state of Oregon is that the court may clarify
the law as to intrastate or wholly inland lakes which are not
susceptible to use for water borne trade or travel over and from
such lakes across state lines. The state of Oregon, and other
states, is vitally interested in knowing what is the law applicable
to the large number of its inland lakes, such as those described
by the naturalist Stanley G. Jewett. .. The state of Oregon, as well
as the other states in the Union which have many lakes entirely
land locked therein, has spent vast sums in stocking these lakes
with fish and making the same available for the use of the
public. . .The state of Oregon, as well as other states, is vitally
interested in knowing whether this court will adopt a rule of law
which will convert all these lakes now used by the public into
private ponds under the doctrine of Bristow v. Corinican, L. R.
3 App. Cas. 141, which case was this court's authority for its
declaration in Hardin v. Jordan of the common law ownership by
the riparian owner to the center of a non-navigable lake, thereby
destroying the public right of fishery therein and the public right
of hunting thereon and boating or navigation. If the common
law as established in Bristow v. Cormican and approved in Hardin
v. Jordan, applies, there are no public or navigable lakes except
those that come within the commercial test. Hence we are asking
the court to clarify herein what is meant by the following defini-
tions of navigable waters, definitions not repeated in recent cases
by this court, some of which are cited by the special master on
pages 17 and 18 of his report."44
The waters in question were held to be non-navigable, and the
state's claim of title to the bed was denied by the court.
Summarizing the later cases, the following propositions would
seem to be reasonably well settled:
Until a state was admitted to the Union, the United States
owned all the lands within its territorial ambit, and had all pro-
prietary and political powers and dominion over it.
Until the state was admitted to the Union, the United States
could dispose of any part of the domain to anyone it saw fit,
including lands underlying navigable waters.
When a state was admitted to the Union, all undisposed of
lands underlying waters then navigable according to the federal
test of navigability passed to the state.
44The citations referred to are:
The Daniel Ball, (1870) 100 Wall. (U.S.) 557, 563, 19 L. Ed. 999;
Oklahoma v. Texas, (1922) 258 U. S. 574, 591, 42 Sup. Ct. 406, 66 L. Ed.
771; United States v. Holt State Bank, (1926) 270 U. S. 49, 56, 46 Sup.
Ct. 197, 70 L. Ed. 465; United Sta':es v. Utah, (1931) 283 U. S. 64, 76,
51 Sup. Ct. 438, 75 L. Ed. 844; Toledo Liberal Shooting Club v. Erie
Shooting Club, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1893) 90 Fed.-680, 682.
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Thereafter the United States could not dispose of such lands
as had thus passed to the state. The state could dispose of such
lands, subject, however, to the jus publicum, which it held "in
trust" and subject to the paramount power of the United States to
regulate and improve the waters in aid of navigation and inter-
state and foreign commerce.
The United States retained the full proprietary powers over
all parts of the public domain which did not pass to the state
as before stated and which had not been previously disposed of.
The effect of a grant by the United States is a federal ques-
tion.4" If unrestricted, it may be construed in accordance with the
local law-but still as a federal question, it being implied that
nothing having been stated to the contrary it was so intended.
Nothing appearing to the contrary, the incidents of riparian
ownership on navigable 40 water, arising by virtue of United
States grants or patents made after statehood4 7 depend on local
law. That is to say, it will depend on the law of the state, whether
the riparian owner owns to high water mark, low water mark or to
the thread of the stream. It would seem clear that the state law
can have no effect on grants made before statehood. At that time
there was no state and no state law. The grant must be construed
in accordance with the applicable United States law. 48
Since the United States retained the beds of non-navigable
waters (non-navigable according to the federal test applied at
the time the state was admitted), it may dispose of those beds
as it sees fit.49  The controlling factor here is the intent of the
grantor. If the beds of non-navigable waters do not pass with
45Bora- Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, (1935) 296 U. S. 10,
22, 56 Sup. Ct. 23, 80 L. Ed. 9. On this point the United States Supreme
Court seems to have come around to and adopted as the rule of future
decision the dissent in Kean v. Calumet Canal Co., (1903) 190 U. S.
452, 461, 23 Sup. Ct. 651, 47 L. Ed. 1134. This dissenting opinion gives
an excellent exposition of the older authorities in support of the present
views of the United States Supreme Court. Its logic on the point also
seems unanswerable.
40Navigable according to the federal test applied as of the date of
the state's admission to the union.
47Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, (1922) 260 U. S.
77, 43 Sup. Ct. 60, 67 L. Ed. 140.
4"The anplicable federal law seems to be stated in Hardin v. Jordan,
(1891) 140 U. S. 371, 11 Sup. Ct. 838, 35 L. Ed. 428. Of course in so far
as the state owns the beds of navigable waters it can make the local law
effective, subject only to the federal powers over navigable waters.
49This proposition must follow on constitutional grounds if it were
not otherwise sustainable.
See United States const. art. IV, sec. 3. Minnesota const. art. II,
sec. a. Lne otner states formed out of the United States public domain
had similar conditions imposed as a condition of admission to the union.
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a grant of the adjacent upland, then they remain in the United
States. The state cannot claim to become the owner of the beds
of such non-navigable waters by virtue of grants of the abutting
upland to individual patentees.50
In the light of the recent United States Supreme Court
decisions heretofore mentioned, it would seem that state courts
generally have misapprehended the purport and effect of Hardin v.
Jordan. First they seem to have assumed that under that decision,
the state test of navigability determined what waters were public
waters, and consequently vested the state with title to the beds of
all waters thus determined to be public." And second, the state
courts seem to have regarded Hardin v. Jordan as laying down a
rule of property instead of a rule of interpretation with reference
to federal grants.5 " The confusion resulting from these not
wholly unwarranted misapprehensions of the effect of Hardin v.
Jordan will be discussed in greater detail later.
In Minnesota the problem of title is rendered more difficult
5
oUnited States v. Oregon, (1935) 295 U. S. 1, 55 Sup. Ct. 610, 79
L. Ed. 1267, clearly decided that the state did not get the beds of non-
navigable waters by virtue of an unrestricted grant of the adjoining
upland to individual patentees. Whether the individual patentees got the
bed was not decided. What passed would seem to depend on the terms
of the grant construed according to federal law.
The effect and import of United States v. Holt State Bank, (1926)
270 U. S. 49, 46 Sup. Ct. 197, 70 L. Ed. 465, and of United States v.
Utah, (1931) 283 U. S. 64, 51 Sup. Ct. 438, 75 L. Ed. 844 seems not to
have been appreciated by the Department of Interior as late as Aug. 5,
1931, for on that date it rendered an opinion in reference to the title to the
beds of meandered non-navigable lakes in Iowa. It concluded that by the
rule of Hardin v. Jordan, the local lawv of Iowa applied to federal grants
of upland adjoining such lakes, and that by the Iowa law the beds did
not pass to the patentees. It did not purport to say who had title. 53 I. D.
431. Cf. James J. Spillane, (1935) 55 I. D. 310 wherein the Department
of the Interior seems to be of the opinion that Hardin v. Jordan is
unshaken by the decision in United States v. Oregon.5 1Lamprey v. State, (1893) 52 Minn. 181, 192, 53 N. W. 1139, 1140,
38 Am, St. Rep. 541, 18 L. R. A. 670 is a complete expression of this
misconception. It runs through the Minnesota cases thenceforth. In
fairness to the state courts let it be said that the federal courts, including
the federal supreme court, entertained the same view. E.g. see Shore v.
Shell Petroleum Corp., (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 1, and cases
therein cited.
52The master's report in United States v. Oregon at p. 39 et seq.
points this out and discusses the matter at length. The long and vigorous
argument of the state of Oregon in answer to the master's contention leaves
no doubt that this point was before the court in that case. See Brief of
the state of Oregon, particularly beginming p. 142, citing many cases and
adding more citations in appendix F. In fairness to the state courts it
should be said that for many years the United States Supreme Court seems
to have been of the view that under Hardin v. Jordan the states could
determine navigability according to the state's view of the matter. See
cases collected in Rose's notes under Hardin v. Jordan.
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because our Supreme Court (probably out of sympathy for the
victims of subaqueous land entrepreneurs) 3 thought it necessary
to declare that the state had no jus privatum in the beds of
navigable waters.5 4  Since the United States Supreme Court had
repeatedly declared that states formed out of the public domain,
upon admission to the union became vested with the title of the
United States to the beds of all waters then navigable and not
previously disposed of,55 it becomes necessary to see what became
of the jus privatum in Minnesota. As before stated, 6 the United
States Supreme Court had said that the riparian rights and title of
riparian grantees of the United States on navigable waters is to
be determined by the local law-that if a state saw fit to renounce
the jus privatum in the beds of such waters, it was free to do so.5 7
Hence, under that doctrine, it would seem to have been within
the power of the state of Minnesota through its properly author-
ized agency to say that such grants from the United States should
convey title to the thread of the stream or center of the body of
water, or that it should be limited to high or low water mark. But
has it clearly said any of these things? Our supreme court has
said that the riparian owner on navigable waters takes absolutely
-
3See Lake Superior Land Co. v. Emerson, (1888) 38 Minn. 406, 38
N. W. 200, 8 Am. St. Rep. 679; Hanford v. St. Paul & Duluth R. Co.,(1889) (1st opinion), 43 Minn. 104, 42 N. W. 596, (2d opinion) (1890)
43 Minn. 110, 44 N. W. 1144, 7 L. R. A. 722, the latter opinion super-
seding the first and overruling the Emerson Case supra; Miller v. Men-
denhall, (1890) 43 Minn. 95, 44 N. W. 1141, 19 Am. St. Rep. 219, 8
L. R. A. 89; Gilbert v. Eldridge, (1891) 47 Minn. 210, 49 N. W. 679, 13
L. R. A. 411; City of Duluth v. St. Paul & Dulutth R. Co., (1892) 49
Minn. 201, 51 N. W. 1163; Bradshaw v. Duluth Imperial Mill Co., (1892)
52 Minn. 59, 53 N. W. 1066; Gilbert v. Emerson, (1893) 55 Minn. 254,
56 N. W. 818, 43 Am. St. Rep. 502.
54Bradshaw v. Duluth Imperial Mill Co., (1892) 52 Minn. 59, 53
N. W. 1065; State v. Korrer, (1914) 127 Minn. 60, 148 N. W. 617, 1095,
L. R. A. 1916C 139. The same view is implicit in the final opinion in
Hanford v. St. Paul & Duluth R. Co., (1889) 43 Minn. 110, 44 N. W.
1144, 7 L. R. A. 722. It must be added, however, that the latter opinion
can be construed as holding that the jus privatum in the bed is in the
riparian proprietor.
The latest judicial statement that Minnesota has no jus privatum
in the beds of navigable waters is found, by way of dictum, in In Re
Petition of Schaller, (1935) 193 Minn. 604, 259 N. W. 529, 826.
-Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, (1845) 3 How. (U.S.) 212, 11 L. Ed.
565; Shively v. Bowlby, (1894) 152 U. S. 1, 14 Sup. Ct. 548, 38 L. Ed. 331;
United States v. Oregon, (1935) 295 U. S. 1, 55 Sup. Ct. 610, 79 L. Ed.
1267. See Fraser, Title to Soil under Public Waters, (1918) 2 MINNESOTA
LAW REVIEw 313, 429, where the cases are collected and discussed.
5G0Notes 29 and 31 supra, and text passim.57Barney v. Keokuk, (1876) 94 U. S. 324, 24 L. Ed. 224; Shively v.
Bowlby, (1894) 152 U. S. 1, 14 Sup. Ct. 548, 38 L. Ed. 331, and cases
therein cited.
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only to high water mark,58 with certain exclusive rights and
privileges to the point of navigability,5 and that the state holds title
to the bed in trust for the public. This latter title, according to
the court, however, includes only the jus publicum. 0 The jus
privatum must be owned by some one. Either it is still in the
United States, on the theory that the state never accepted the jus
privatum title, or it is in the riparian owners, or in the state
notwithstanding the declarations of the court to the contrary.
Is the jus privatum in these lands in the riparian owners?
Under the doctrine of Hardin v. Jordan,61 Barney v. Keokuk,02 and
other cases of like tenor, it may be assumed that the state through
its properly authorized agency could vest the jus privatum title in
the riparian owners.6 3 Conceivably it could say that the jus
privatum in the beds of navigable waters should vest in patentees
of the United States upon issuance of a United States patent
of lands riparian to navigable waters. As to lands conveyed by
the United States before statehood, the jus privatum in the beds
of contiguous navigable waters must be deemed to have passed
from the United States to the patentee when the patent issued,
or to have been vested in such riparian owners by some sort of
grant from the state after it came into being. Has the state
made such grants? It is true that in Hobart v. Hall,0 4 judge
Morris, after an exhaustive review of the contradictory Minnesota
decisions made up to that time, concluded that in Minnesota the
jus privatum in the beds of navigable waters was in the riparian
owner subject to the jus publicum in the state. That view was
affirmed by the circuit court of appeals.6 5 It is submitted that
these federal courts were in error in so finding. The decision
is founded upon a construction of decisions of the state Supreme
Court, none of which is founded on any alleged grant by the
58in re Minnetonka Lake Improvement, (1894) 56 Minn. 513, 58
N. W. 295, 45 Am. St. Rep. 494; State v. Korrer, (1914) 127 Minn. 60,
148 N. W. 617, 1095, L. R. A. 1916C 139.59Bradshaw v. Duluth Imperial Mill Co., (1892) 52 Minn. 59, 53
N. W. 1066; Hanford v. St. Paul & Duluth R. R. Co., (1890) 43 Minn.
110, 44 N. W. 1144, 7 L. R. A. 722; Miller v. Mendenhall, (1890) 43
Minn. 95, 44 N. W. 1141, 19 Am. St. Rep. 219, 8 L. R. A., and see
Hobart v. Hall, (C.C. Minn. 1909) 174 Fed. 433, where the Minnesota
cases up to that time are exhaustively reviewed.
6OBradshaw v. Duluth Imperial Mill Co., (1892) 52 Minn. 59, 53
N. W. 1066.61(1891) 140 U. S. 371, 11 Sup. Ct. 808, 35 L. Ed. 428.
62(1876) 94 U. S. 324, 24 L. Ed. 224.
6sHardin v. Shedd, (1902) 190 U. S. 508, 519, 23 Sup. Ct. 685, 47
L. Ed. 1156.64(C.C. Minn. 1909) 174 Fed. 433.
65Hall v. Hobart, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1911) 186 Fed. 426.
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state of the jus privatum. Furthermore, it is submitted that it is
not within the constitutional power of the Minnesota supreme
court to make any grants of state lands. That power resides in
the legislature.c0
That the jus privatum is not in the United States can be
shown to a demonstration. By the act authorizing the creation
of the state of Minnesota0 7 the United States offered the new state
the same title to these lands as other states had to similar lands.
That offer was accepted by the people by the adoption of the
state constitution, s and the grant was completed and confirmed
by the act of congress admitting the state of Minnesota to the
union on an equal footing with the then existing states. 9 This
constitutional acceptance of the proffered title would seem to be
an incontrovertible fact, and to be beyond the power of our
Supreme Court or any other department of state government to
gainsay. 70 Nevertheless, the view taken by the federal courts in
Hobart v. Hall is more sensible than the view later taken by our
supreme court in State v. Korrer.7 1 Before that case was decided
our court had said that the state did not have the jus privatum
in the beds of navigable waters. It had said that the absolute title
of the riparian owner on such waters stopped at high water
mark. It had said that the riparian owner had exclusive rights and
privileges in the bed opposite his riparian lands which spelled out
a jus privatum in the riparian owner, or at the very least gave
him an exclusive power to acquire it. It State z. Korrer these
contradictory views came in conflict, and the substance of the
court's decision in the case seems to be that the jus privatum is
owned by no one. That seems to be the last word on the point
from our supreme court. It is inconceivable that such a view
can prevail. The court must choose.
It may be helped to the right choice by a reading of Angelo v.
Railroad Contmission,72 decided by the supreme court of Wis-
consin in 1928. Prior to that case, the Wisconsin court had fallen
60 ifinnesota const. art. 4, sec. 32b; art. 8, sec. 2.
0711 Stat. at L. 167.
, Minnesota const. art. 2, sec. 3.
coil Stat. at L. 285.
7oIn Fleckstein v. Lambertson, (1879) 69 Minn. 187, 72 N. W. 65,
the court referring to the grant of ten sections of land for the erection
of public buildings at the seat of government, says that this grant was
"accepted irrevocably" in the manner above stated in the text.
71(1914) 127 Minn. 60, 148 N. W. 617, 1095, L. R. A. 1916C 139.
72(1928) 194 Wis. 543, 217 N. W. 570. The court and anyone else
interested will also find a ready made brief on the point in Fraser, Title to
the Soil Under Public Waters, (1918) 2 MINNESOTA LAW REvIrw 313, 429.
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into. the same error as had our court. In the case mentioned the
Wisconsin court reviews its prior conflicting decisions and dicta,
and declares that the state of Wisconsin owns the jus privatum
of the beds of waters it considers and declares navigable."3
As before stated, whether the state shall by some conveyance
or declaration vest the jus privatum in riparian owners is a
question for the legislature. Soon after State z. Korrer was de-
cided, the legislature made a declaration of its views on the point
by authorizing certain state officers to make mineral leases of the
beds of navigable waters in the state.7 4  It is submitted that the
act is valid and is a declaration by the department of government
having sole power to dispose of the state's title. It seems to be
an unequivocal legislative declaration that the jus privatum in the
beds of navigable waters is in the state. That declaration is in
accord with the common law.75
Integrating these matters, it will be seen that in the case of
private boundaries on waters, it is necessary to find first whether
at the date of the admission of Minnesota to the Union, the waters
were navigable according to the federal test. If so, the line of
absolute ownership will be set at the high -water mark. That
will be so whether the original grant of riparian lands to a private
owner was made by the state or by the United States and whether
made by the United States before or after statehood. If the
waters were then non-navigable under state and federal test of
public waters, the riparian proprietor owns to the thread of the
stream or center of the body.76 If the waters were then navigable
or public waters according to the state test of navigability but
not according to the federal test, confusion results. Clearly if
the United States issued an unrestricted grant of lands riparian
to such waters to an individual before statehood, the patentee's
title would extend to the center of the stream or body of water.77
73The case in question seems wrong in appearing to hold the waters in
question to be navigable-certainly under the federal test of navigability.
74Minnesota Laws 1917. ch. 110 and see Minnesota Laws 1937, ch. 118.
75Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters, (1918) 2 MINNESOTA
LAw REvIEW 313, 429.
76Shell v. Matteson, (1900) 81 Minn. 38, 83 N. W. 491; Lamprey v.
State, (1893) 52 Minn.. 181, 193, 53 N. W. 1139, 38 Am. St. Rep. 541,
18 L. R. A. 670. Cases are collected in 1 Dunnell's Dig. (2d ed. 1927)
secs. 1067, 1070.
77Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, (1922) 260 U. S.
77, 43 Sup. Ct. 60, 67 L. Ed. 14.0: United States v. Holt State Bank,
(1925) 270 U. S. 49, 46 Sup. Ct. 197, 70 L. Ed. 465; Oklahoma v. Texas,
(1921) 258 U. S. 574, 42 Sup. Ct. 406, 66 L. Ed. 771. This must follow
from the admitted fact that the United States could, before statehood,
convey title to land under navigable waters; Knight v. United States Land
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-The same result must follow from the issuance of an un-
restricted patent of such lands to an individual after statehood.
7 8
If in the latter case it is claimed that a state rule of law or statute
limits the patentee's title to high (or low) water mark because
the state test makes the contiguous waters navigable, then that
result must be justified on the ground that the United States
intended as a matter of fact that its grant should be construed
in view of the state rule.70 That would amount to the implication
of an exception of the bed. If such an implication can be and
is found, the part of the bed which otherwise would have been
granted would then remain in the United States.80 The state did
not get the bed upon admission to the union because at' the time
of admission, the waters were not navigable according to the
federal test. The state cannot acquire title to the bed by a state
rule of law or statute by which it purports to say that when the
United States patents such lands to an individual, the contiguous
bed shall be deemed to belong to the state."' Nor can Minnesota
control federal grants of such lands.8
2
Ass'n, (1891) 142 U. S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct. 258, 35 L. Ed. 974; Shively v.
Bowlby, (1894) 152 U. S. 1, 14 Sup. Ct. 548, 38 L. Ed. 331; Prosser
v. Northern Pacific R. R., (1894) 152 U. S. 59, 14 Sup. Ct. 528, 38 L. Ed.
352; Packer v. Bird, (1891) 137 U. S. 661, 11 Sup. Ct. 210, 34 L. Ed. 819;
though it seldom did so, and hence in this latter situation inclusion of the
bed of such waters will not be implied.78United States v. Oregon, (1935) 295 U. S. 1, 27, 55 Sup. Ct. 610, 79
L. Ed. 1267.
7DUnited States v. Oregon, (1935) 295 U. S. 1, 27, 55 Sup. Ct. 610,
79 L. Ed. 1267; Oklahoma v. Texas, (1922) 258 U. S. 574, 594, 42 Sup.
Ct. 406, 66 L. Ed. 771 and cases therein cited. Cf. the suggestion of Mr.
Justice Holmes in Hardin v. Shedd, (1903) 190 U. S. 508, 519, 23 Sup. Ct.
685, 47 L. Ed. 1156.
sOUnited States v. Oregon, (1935) 295 U. S. 1, 55 Sup. Ct. 610, 79
L. Ed. 1267.
slUnited States v. Oregon, (1935) 295 U. S. 1, 27-29, 55 Sup. Ct.
610, 79 L. Ed. 1267. The notion that a state formed out of the United
States public domain can vest itself with title to the beds of waters not
navigable according to the federal test at the time of its admission to
the union by the simple expedient of a legislative or judicial declaration
and applh.ation of a broader test of navigability must be regarded as thor-
oughly exploded by the recent United States Supreme Court decisions
heretofore cited. Minnesota and Wisconsin have used this method. See
Ne-Pee-Nauk Club v. Wilson, (1897) 96 Wis. 290, 71 N. W. 661 wherein
the "navigable waters" were liquid mud; and Baker v. Voss, (1935) 217
Wis. 415, 259 N. W. 413 in which two connected duck ponds were held
to be navigablh waters. The reports of these states, especially the Wis-
consin reports are full of similar cases. Query whether the lake in
State v. Korrer, (1914) 127 Minn. 60, 148 N. W. 617, 1095, L. R. A.
1916C 139, was navigable water under the federal test when Minnesota
became a state. Even less tenable is the attempt of such states to vest
themselves with title to the beds of waters non-navigable under either
test. For a list of states that have attempted to arrogate title to such
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If the United States granted lands riparian to such waters (navig-
able by the state test, non-navigable by federal test) to the state,
the state would become the owner of the adjacent bed to the center
of the stream or body of water. When the state then conveyed
these lands to individuals, it could impose its test of navigability
in so far as it now owned the bed and by the application of state
law limit the title of the state's grantee to high water mark. The
waters overlying the parts of the bed thus owned by the state would
be public waters. But the waters overlying the bed opposite riparian
lands patented by the United States to individual patentees would
be private waters. The rights and privileges of the patentee would
be fixed at the time of the patent by federal law and could not be
altered by state law. 83 The patentee from the United States could
fish, swim, and boat in and over the waters opposite the lands of
the state's grantee, without being guilty of trespass, and so could
anyone else who had lawful access to those waters. But the
state's grantee and others would have no right so to use the
waters opposite the lands of the patentee of the United States
and within his bounds in the bed. They would be trespassers.8
lands to themselves see Patton, Titles (1938) 289, n. 169. The state of
Iowa has made broad claims in this respect. It is to be noted that Marshall
Dental Mfg. Co. v. Iowa, (1913) 226 U. S. 460, 33 Sup. Ct. 168, 57 L. Ed.
300, did not decide that the state of Iowa had title to the bed of the lake.
See United States v. Oregon, (1935) 295 U. S. 1, 27, 55 Sup. Ct. 610,
79 L. Ed. 1267; Riparian Rights in Meandered Lake Beds in the State
of Iowa, (1931) 53 Land Dec. (U.S.) 429. Cf. In re James J. Spillane,
(1935) 55 I. D. (U.S.) 310 in which it is believed that the effect of United
States v. Oregon is understated.
82Minnesota const. art. 2, sec. 3. Similar restraints were imposed
on other states formed out of the public domain.
s3See Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, (1922) 260
U. S. 77, 88, 89, 43 Sup. Ct. 60, 67 L. Ed. 140.:
The dictum in Luscher v. Reynolds, (1935) 153 Or. 625, 56 P. (2d)
1158, decided since United States v. Oregon, is clearly wrong. See the
cases cited and discussed in Hardin v. Jordan on the rights of riparian
owners on non-navigable waters. On this point, Leonard v. Pearce, (1932)
348 Ill. 518, 181 N. E. 399 is more likely to forecast the history of small
inland lakes, than the dictum of the Oregon Case above cited.
841llustrative of the resulting situation is the Reelfoot Lake Case, State
ex rel. Cates v. Tennessee Land Co., (1913) 127 Tenn. 575, 158 S. W. 746,
Ann. Cas. 1914B 1043. The case is probably unique, involving a lake
(two to seven miles wide and fifteen to twenty miles long containing
some 30,000 acres) formed by an earthquake after land now submerged
had been granted to private owners. Or if an illustration nearer home is
desired, reference may be made to the plat in Markusen v. Mortenson,(1908) 105 Minn. 10, 13, 116 N. W. 1021. Assume the lake therein to
be of the character here discussed, assume that the odd numbered govern-
ment lots there shown passed into private ownership directly from the
United States and the remainder from the state. The public would be
entitled to public uses only over that part of the bed allotted to the
owners of the even numbered lots. Intrusions beyond those parts would
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Undoubtedly, the state of Minnesota can apply its test of naviga-
bility to a considerable area of the beds of lakes non-navigable
by federal test but navigable by the state test. The United States
granted about one-third of all the land in the state to the state
of Minnesota. Over four and a half million acres of this total
came under the swamp lands grants.8 5 If one may assume that the
swamp land grants wholly or partly encircle many small lakes,
then it will follow that the state in fact owns or-owned parts or
all of the beds of these lakes even though not navigable under the
federal test, and in making conveyance of such riparian lands
the state could impose its test. But it could not impose its test
with reference to lands on any such lakes which the federal
government granted directly to settlers.58
Thus it will be seen that determining the title to sub-aqueous
lands in Minnesota may involve some difficulty. It will be neces-
sary to determine first whether or not the waters in question were
navigable according to the federal test at the time the state was
admitted to the union. If so, the state has title to the bed and the
state law will determine the extent of title and the nature of
riparian rights of the abutting land owners. If not, then the
history of the title of each abutting land owner must be inquired
into. These things must be done before lines can be run.
As to land riparian to navigable waters under the federal or
state test, whichever is applicable, another line must be found-
the line or point of navigability. It is to this line or point that
the riparian owner may reclaim or improve under Minnesota law.
He is limited to this line even though we assume that he has the
jus privatum to the thread or center of the waters in question.
The locus of the point or line of navigability is as variable as
the criteria for its determination. Our court has said that it is
incapable of fixed definition, that "its meaning and application
be trespass. Putnam v. Kinney, (1929) 248 Mich. 410, 227 N. W. 741;
Lembeck v. Nye, (1890) 47 Ohio St. 336, 24 N. E. 686, 8 L. R. A. 578,
21 Am. St. Rep. 828; and see cases collected in note, 5 A. L. R. 1056.
Cf. Beach v. Hayner, (1919) 207 Mich. 93, 173 N. W. 487, 5 A. L. R. 1052.
BrOrfield, Federal Land Grants (1915) 147-152. The writer states
that as of July 31, 1912, the swamp land grants totaled 4,788,712 acres
with claims for more pending. As of June 30, 1907, this writer states that
63,356,541 acres had been granted by the federal government to fifteen
states under the Swamp-Land Act. Id. 118.
sIt may be noted that this conflict and confusion will be eliminated
if the United States Supreme Court should expand its definition of
navigability so as to be as broad as the state test. To accomplish this
result it would not have to go nearly so far as it lately has gone in
expanding its definition of interstate commerce.
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must vary and depend upon circumstances.18 7  Factors the court
suggests for consideration are the kind of navigation for which
the waters are used or adapted, the stages of water and the size
and kind of vessels navigating the waters in question."9 The
application of this definition is also necessarily limited to such
waters as are public waters by the state rule and only so far
as the state test of public waters is effective. Within that sphere
and so far as navigability is a factor in the state test of public
waters, it may be seen that in particular cases the line or point
of navigability may be determined by the draft of a duck boat,
a canoe, or even a saw log destined for a pulp mill. In others
it may be determined by the draft of a loaded Great Lakes
freighter. In the case of navigable waters of the United States,
the point or line of navigability must be determined in harmony
with the federal test of navigability. Furthermore, in navigable
waters of the United States, the power of the United States is
paramount. Regardless of what the state may have permitted
in the way of reclamation or construction in, on, or over the
beds of such navigable waters, the United States may compel
its removal, or itself remove it without liability to the person who
put it there, and without compensation paid for alleged injuries
resulting therefrom. 9 Not only that, but all reclamation of the
beds of such navigable waters or structures on the beds thereof
are unlawful except as authorized by the United States.90 Clearly,
the owners of docks, wharves, piers, and filled-in lands on the bed
of Lake Superior have nothing more than a license revocable by
the United States in aid of navigation, and without compensation.9 '
87Union Depot etc. Co. v. Brunswick, (1883) 31 Minn, 297, 17 N. W.
626, 47 Am. Rep. 789.
88State v. Lamprey, (1893) 52 Minn. 181, 53 N. W. 1139, 38 Am. St.
Rep. 541, 18 L. R. A. 670, will suggest others.
89Union Bridge Co. v. United States, (1907) 204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup.
Ct. 367, 51 L. Ed. 523; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, (1912) 223 U. S. 605,
32 Sup. Ct. 340, 56 L. Ed. 570; Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co.
v. Briggs, (1913) 229 U. S. 82, 33 Sup. Ct. 679, 57 L. Ed. 1083; Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co. v. United States, (1913) 229 U. S. 53, 33 Sup.
Ct. 667, 57 L. Ed. 1063; Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison,
(1915) 237 U. S. 251, 35 Sup. Ct. 551, 59 L. Ed. 939.
9033 U. S. C. A. secs. 401, 403, 404, 406.
9iGreenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, (1915) 237 U. S. 251,
35 Sup. Ct. 551, 59 L. Ed. 939; and see cases cited in note 89 supra. With
the Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. Case, supra, compare the language
of Mitchell, J. in Bradshaw v. Duluth Imperial Mill Co., (1892) 52 Minn.
59, 64, 53 N. W. 1066, 1068, in reference to the nature of the riparian
right in the submerged lands, the effect of establishing dock lines, and
the power of the state over that area. It would seem the views there
expressed on these points are erroneous and must be modified at least
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In such waters, the line to which improvements may be made must
be ascertained by application to the proper United States author-
ities. The dock lines established in Duluth harbor by the munici-
pality are effective only until the United States chooses to act.
They are not binding on the federal authorities. Nor does the
establishment of dock or harbor lines by the federal government
create vested rights. They may be changed from time to time, and
without compensation. 2  Nevertheless, dock or harbor lines
established by the United States, or, in the absence of federal
action, by the state, mark the point or line of navigability, subject,
however, to change9 3
Still another factor in determining water boundaries is the
law of accretion.04  By the common law of accretion, the owner
of lands abutting on public or private waters becomes owner of
the addition made to his lands by the gradual deposit of soil, or
the dereliction of the boundary waters. Title to the accreted or
relicted land is in him against whose water front it forms.05 Title
may be gained or lost by the common law of accretion.96 If a
stream, public or private, shifts over by a process of accretion on
one side and erosion on the other, the thread of the stream will
bhift17 and if that is the boundary, the boundary shifts with it. A
stream may widen by erosion on one side without corresponding
accretion on the other, and again the thread of the stream will shift
to the new geographical center. In theory a water boundary is
a fixed boundary. But this is true only in the sense that the
riparian owner retains his water boundary however much or far it
may shift, provided only that the change* or shift be gradual and
not a sudden process. Thus it will be seen that high water mark,
low water mark, the thread of the stream or lake, and the point
so far as navigatinn is concerned. See in re Minnetonka Lake Improve-
ment (1894) 56 Minn. 513, 520, 58 N. W. 295, 296, 45 Am. St. Rep. 494.02Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, (1912) 204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct.
367, 51 L. Ed. 523; Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, (1915)
237 U. S. 251, 35 Sup. Ct. 551, 59 L. Ed. 939.
D3So far as land locked lakes within the state are concerned, it may
be said that the state has been and is inexcusably remiss in the per-
formance of its public trust. In such waters the point or line of navigability
seems to be determined by the will of the riparian owner. Dredges destroy
lake bottoms and fill in the bed at other points, generally without let or
hindrance.
041 Farnham, Waters and Water Rights (1904) 320 et seq. Patton,
Titles (1938) sec. 170 et seq.
5i Farnham, Waters and Water Rights (1904) 328.
OdJefferis v. East Omaha Land Co.. (1890) 134 U. S. 178, 10 Sup. Ct.
518, 33 L. Ed. 872; Widdecombe v. Chiles, (1903) 173 Mo. 195, 73 S. W.
444, 61 L. R. A. 309, 96 Am. St. Rep. 507.
97Arnd v. Harrington, (Iowa, 1939) 287 N. W. 292.
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or line of navigability in public waters, can in fact be determined
only as of a particular time, and they are always subject to change.
Water boundaries in lakes may change by the gradual action
of the waters washing away soil or building it up. Lakes may
slowly disappear. 5 The law of accretion applies to lakes as well
as to streams.99 In cases where the water level remains constant,
but there is erosion of the shore line or the deposit of alluvion
against the shore, the law of accretion will apply. It is applicable
also to the reliction of lake waters, 100 and no doubt will be applied
when actions to determine title and boundaries of relicted lands
are brought at frequent intervals while the reliction is in progress.
If however, the riparian owners delay such action until all or most
of the former bed is dry land, our court has largely ignored the
law of accretion.10 ' The law of accretion is relied on to give the
riparian owners title generally, but not for the purpose of de-
limiting the title. The delimitation of the bed is said to be an
equitable one.'02
After the nature and extent of the riparian owner's title has
been determined in accordance with the principles heretofore re-
viewed, the surveyor may be called in to run the lines delimiting
the title. The private stream that is the boundary between opposite
riparians furnishes the simplest case. If the stream is not mean-
dered, the government survey lines will cross the stream in a
straight line.
Unmeandered streams are not boundaries of anything so far
as the government surveys are concerned. Hence a conveyance
of land crossed by such a stream, according to the United States
government survey, incorporates the government subdivision lines
as shown by the government plats, and where these lines cross the
stream, they indicate the boundary in and across the stream."0 '
9SLamprey v. State, (1893) 52 Minn. 181, 53 N. W. 1139, 3S Am.
St. Rep. 541, 18 L. R. A. 670. Minnesota cases are collected in 1 Dun-
nell's Digest, (2d ed. 1927) sec. 1070.
991 Farnham, Water and Water Rights (1904) 329.
100Hanson v. Rice, (1903) 88 Minn. 273, 92 N. W. 982. Cases are
collected in an annotation, (1938) 112 A. L. R. 1121.
lOlThis is true in most of the cases cited in 1 Dunnell's Dig. (2d ed.
1927) sec. 1070.
lo2Scheifert v. Briegel, (1903) 90 Minn. 125, 96 N. W. 44, 101 Am.
St. Rep. 399. In this case the court purports to follow the law of accretion
in delimiting ownership, and notes that it would be easier to apply had
there been but a slight recession. If in delimiting ownership of the bed
the equitable solution of this case follows the law, it would seem not to
be the law of accretion. Some of the division lines appear to be purely
arbitrary.
1
0 3 The dictum in Kirkpatrick v. Yates Ice Co., (1891) 45 Mo. App.
335 supports this view and is believed correct.
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If the stream is made a boundary in a private conveyance, then
the thread of the stream will be the stream boundary. Descrip-
tions by lines or calls other than the government survey lines
will place the points and lines wherever the conveyance places
them. In either case, if the locus of the side lines in the stream
is left in doubt, one would expect them to run in a straight
projection of the upland side line into the unmeandered stream.
The reason for thus projecting the upland side lines into and
across unmeandered streams is that where the government did
not meander waters, the beds were disposed of as so much land. 0 4
In the meandered private stream, the thread of the stream is
still the boundary between opposite riparians, but a different rule
will apply to the running of the side lines in the stream. The
east, west, north, and south government survey lines now do not
run across the stream. 05 In surveying practice they run to the
meander line and stop there, 00 although the thread of the stream
is the exterior boundary at this point. The effect of meandering
is to make the section or other government subdivision in or
through which the waters extend fractional subdivisions. These
fractional subdivisions are disposed of as such by the United
States government. 0 7  Should the upland side line boundaries
of the fractional subdivisions be projected into meandered waters
in a straight line to form the boundary between the meander line
and the thread of the stream? It has been so held in a few
cases, °'0 but the weight of authority is to the effect that the
angle at which the upland side boundaries approach a water
10o'It is not to be understood that because waters are not meandered,
therefore their presence is ignored in the surveys, field notes, and plats.
It simply means that the government surveys have not made the un-
meandered waters one boundary of a fractional section. If waters are not
meandered, the section is not a fractional section. As to what waters are
to be meandered, see Manual of Instructions (1930 Ed.) 216-222.
10543 U. S. C. A. sec. 751, 752. Manual of Instructions (1930 Ed.)
pp. 182 et seq., 216 et seq.1oGManual of Instructions (1930 Ed.) 182, 216.
1O7Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., (1890) 134 U. S. 178, 10 Sup.
Ct. 518, 33 L. Ed. 872; Widdecombe v. Chiles, (1903) 173 Mo. 195, 73
S. W. 444, 61 L. R. A. 309, 96 Am. St. Rep. 507.
'
0sRector v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 20 F. (2d) 845,
872, in which the decision on the point seems to be off hand and un-
considered. The briefs did not discuss the point. The decision therein is in
conflict with the decision in three appeals from the same final decree in
United States v. Hayes, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 20 F. (2d) 873, which
will be discussed post. See also Burton v. Isaacson, (1913) 122 Minn.
483, 142 N. W. 925; and Sherwin v. Bitzer, (1906) 97 Minn. 252, 106
N. W. 1046, where the court seems so to hold without considering the point.
These Minnesota cases do not, however, represent the rule in this state.
The cases can be explained as judicial aberrations.
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boundary is of no consequence in determining the direction of the
lateral lines in the bed.1"9 Reason sustains the weight of authority.
The rule adopted should be one of the widest possible if not
universal application. The rule should be one that fits into the
fabric of the law; one that promotes the best use of the bed and
gives each riparian owner his due in accordance with the physical
situation of his land on the water. Projecting the side lines
straight into the bed does none of these things except occasionally
and by mere accident.
It is submitted that the correct rule is set down by the special
master in Rector v. United States and United States v. Hayes.1" 0
His conclusions of law on this point read thus:
"The riparian rights of the abutting lot owners are to be
determined by dropping a perpendicular from where the meander
line intersects the boundary line, to the thread of the stream and
these perpendiculas mark the boundaries of the riparian rights
from the meander line to the thread of the stream, and also in-
clude the land between the river and the meander line.
"In dropping the perpendiculars from the intersections of the
meander line with the boundary lines of the various lots, the
thread of the stream is to be considered as a straight line and the
perpendiculars dropped to that straight line."'"
This report of the special master was adopted by the lower court
in its final decree," 2 and the final decree of the lower court was
affirmed in United States z. Hayss."1 3
1099 C. J. 178, sec. 48; 45 C. J. 513, sec. 167; 45 C. J. 521, sec. 184.
Patton, Titles (1938) sec. 77.
Whatever rule or method is used to determine the direction of the
lateral line in the bed, courts generally agree that the direction of the
upland side line is not determinative.
"10The Rector Case, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 20 F. (2d) 845, was but one
appeal of four from the final decree in an action brought by the United
States against numerous defendants and intervenors. The other three
appeals were disposed of in United States v. Hayes, (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1927) 20 F. (2d) 873.
"'Vol. II, p. 1259 of the Record in United States v. Cimarron River
Oil Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 20 F. (2d) 873. Apparently this record
was common to all the appeals. Defendant Rector did not except to this
conclusion.
"12Vol. II, p. 1357 of the Record in United States v. Cimarron River
Oil Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 20 F. (2d) 873.
'3(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 20 F. (2d) 873.
The Rector appeal from the decree complained of an order of the
lower court reducing royalties payable under leases made of the Rector
lands. The results of the court's statement or decision with reference
to the stream bed boundaries in the Rector appeal, and the affirmance of the
lower court in the Hayes et. al. appeals, where the question of title was the
main issue, is to create overlaps and gaps between the boundaries of
defendant Rector and her neighbors. It is impossible to suppose that the
statement in the Rector case was anything but an unfortunate inadvertence.
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The injustice and conflicts that result from the application of
the erroneous rule of straight projection of the upland side lines
are easily demonstrated by means of figure 1. Figure 1 repre-
sents part of the land in issue in Rector v. United States114 and
in United States v. Hayes."' For the purpose of this discussion,
the meander line is assumed to coincide with high water mark
although in fact it did not. The unbroken lines indicate how the
lateral lines in the bed should run into the bed at right angles,
to the thread of the stream, in accordance with the master's re-
port affirmed in United States v. Hayes. Appellant Rector in
Rector v. United States owned government lots 16 6 and 7 of
section 5, and government lots 9 and 10 of section 6. By the rule
of straight projection of the upland side lines, the owners of gov-
ernment lots 3 and 7 in section 6 would get a relatively large
area of river bed. The owners of lots 2, 5, and 13 of section 6
would never reach the thread of the stream at all, and would by
this rule cease to be riparian owners when the waters receded,
contrary to the law of accretion and the general rule applicable to
riparian rights."7  Lot 13 of section 6, although it has a short
water boundary according to the government survey, would to all
intents and purposes be nonriparian according to this rule. Again,
the rule of straight projection results in conflicts and may leave
parts of the bed, especially of lakes, without an owner." s  Sup-
pose that lot 6 of section 5 were owned by A and lot 9 of section
6, by B. A could now claim that his western boundary should be
It is doubly unfortunate that the true rule is not stated in the decision
in the Hayes Case. There was no further proceeding in the Rector
appeal. Certiorari was denied by the U. S. Supreme Court in the othet
three appeals. (1927) 275 U. S. 552, 555.
114(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 20 F. (2d) 845.
115(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 20 F. (2d) 873.
"(;See Manual of Instructions (1930 Ed.) secs. 196 et seq. for the
meaning of government lot.
'"7Lamprey v. State, (1893) 52 Minn. 181, 53 N. W. 1139, 38 Am.
St. Rep. 541, 18 L. R. A. 670.
11SThe rule of straight projection would "sectionize" the beds of
meandered waters, whereas the United States government surveys did not
run its lines into or through such beds. 43 U. S. C. A., sec. 752. In the
case of a lake, if the side lines of a fractional subdivision are extended
into the bed the same conflicts pointed out in the text and more would
result. Th2 possibilities may be explored by thus projecting the lines
in the figures given in Scheifert v. Briegel, (1903) 90 Minn. 125, 96 N. W.
44, 101 Am. St. Rep. 399 or in Hanson v. Rice, (1903) 88 Minn. 273,
92 N. W. 982, where the straight projection method was disapproved
because of the resulting conflicts. Further difficulties are indicated in
Blatchford v. Voss, (1928) 197 Wis. 461, 219 N. W. 100 and the cases
therein cited. Some rule for limiting the straight projection of upland
boundaries seems a necessary accompaniment of the straight projection rule.
332 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
TITLE, POINTS AND LINES
projected straight north to the thread of the stream. B could
claim that his south boundary should be extended straight east to
the thread of the stream. Which shall prevail? Again, if the
eastern upland boundary of lot 5 of section 6 were extended it
would conflict with the claims of the owner of lot 4, unless the
projection of the line were stopped at its intersection with the
projection of the east and west line between lots 4 and 5. The
conflict between the Rector boundaries in the bed as stated in the
Rector Case (indicated by broken lines in Figure 1) with the
boundaries of her neighbors as laid down by the master and
affirmed in the Hayes Case is apparent at a glance. When it is
remembered that the record in these cases showed the bed-of this
river to be peppered with producing oil and gas wells, the im-
portance of just and nonconflicting boundaries in the bed is
apparent.
Another reason for projecting the lateral line in the bed from
the intersection of the upland boundary with high water mark at
right angles to the stream is that most improvements in the beds
of waters are located along those lines. Docks, piers, wharves,
dams, and bridges are commonly placed at right angles to the
thread of the stream. Thus the rule contended for promotes the
best use of the bed and waters. Again this direction of the lines
tends to preserve riparian rights when the waters recede and is in
harmony with the maxim, once a riparian always a riparian. It
accords with the process and the law of accretion and reliction.
A further reason for running the lateral lines at right angles
to the thread of the stream is that the rule can and should be
applied to private boundaries whether the description is made
with reference to the United States government surveys or not.319
In the construction of conveyances, there is no reason for differ-
entiating between various forms of describing land. If by the
terms of a metes and bounds description the grantee is given a
water boundary, he is as much a riparian owner and has the
same riparian rights as if the land had been described by refer-
ence to the United States government surveys. There is the same
practical reason for construing all conveyances of lands bounding
on meandered waters in harmony with conveyances of such lands
according to the United States government surveys as there is in
"Oft is assumed that the description does not indicate the direction
of the lateral lines in the bed. If the description does so, it controls, of
course, provided the grantor owns what he purports to convey.
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the case of lands bounded by unmeandered waters.120  The rule
of projecting the upland boundary in a straight line into the bed
would produce more conflicts in the case of metes and bounds
descriptions than it does in the case of government survey lines,
because metes and bounds descriptions may run lines in any
direction, whereas government lines run only north and south
or east and west. If one rule were applied to government survey
lines and a different rule were applied to metes and bounds de-
scriptions, the result would be chaotic. That may be seen by
simply superimposing boundaries approaching the stream in Figure
1 by lines not parallel to the government survey lines, and then
projecting them into the bed by straight continuations.
Finally, the rule that lateral boundaries in the bed shall be at
right angles to the thread of the stream can be and is applied in
determining the bounds within which riparian rights may be
exercised in navigable waters.1-1 Likewise it can be and is
applied through the body of elongated lakes.12 2 Granted that the
rule stated may not be applicable in some exceptional cases, it is
submitted that it is a rule that can be applied by courts and sur-
veyors with just and equitable results in the great majority of all
cases.
Another formula frequently stated and applied by the courts in
apportioning accretions and relictions is also applied in running
the lateral boundaries in waters. This formula runs thus: Meas-
ure the entire water front of the riparian owners concerned as it
was at the time the parcels were laid out, whether by original
government survey or subsequent plotting, noting also the extent
of original frontage of each lot or parcel. Then measure the
thread of the stream as it now lies opposite the original frontage
-OAgain it may be pointed out that the difference between meandered
and unmeandered waters is that in the case of the former, the government
surveys make the waters one or more of the boundaries of a fractional
subdivision and the north and south, and east and west lines, do not enter
or cross the bed, they go simply to the water. In the case of the latter,
the surveys do not make the unmeandered waters the boundary of any
subdivision, and the survey lines run through and across these waters.
12 'Clark v. Campau, (1869) 19 Mich. 325; A. M. Campau Realty Co.
v. City of Detroit, (1910) 162 Mich. 243, 127 N. W. 365, 139 Am. St. Rep.
555; Menasha Wooden-Ware Co. v. Lawson, (1888) 70 Wis. 600, 36
N. W. 412.
In all cases the objective sought by the courts is a fair division. The
xules and methods for reaching it are not uniform, as may be seen by
examining the cases cited to the point in 9 C. J. 178, notes 38 and 39;
and see Patton, Titles (1938) secs. 77, 172.
"22Rooney v. Stearns County, (1915) 130 Minn. 176, 153 N. W. 858.
See also Hardin v. Jordan, (1891) 140 U. S. 371, 11 Sup. Ct. 808, 35
L. Ed. 428.
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first measured. Then divide the thread of the stream line into as
many equal parts as there were lineal feet of original frontage.
Then give each riparian owner as many parts on the thread of the
stream line as he had lineal feet of original frontage, and com-
plete the delimitation by drawing straight lines from the termini
of the upland boundaries as they were on the original frontage
to the points found as above on the thread of the stream.1 12  In
brief, divide the new frontage in proportion to the old. In many
cases, perhaps most cases, the results will be the same as by the
method just given. The latter formula, however, would seem to
be slipshod. It leaves indefinite the points between which the
thread of the stream is to be measured. Presumably they are
found at points on the thread of the stream from which a line run
at right angles to the thread of the stream will strike the termini
of the outside upland side lines at the original water front. If
those two points are thus found, why should not the other inter-
mediate points be found by the same method? Of course there
is the impractical alternative of measuring the whole river front
or sea coast.
The question remains when, if ever, should the shore termini
of the lateral lines in the bed be at the intersection of the upland
side lines with the meander line? Since meander lines are not
normally boundary lines, and since in Minnesota absolute own-
ership extends to high water mark on public waters and to the
thread of the stream or center in private waters, taking a meander
corner as the starting point is merely a matter of convenience.
The regulations for the United States government surveys direct
the surveyors to run the meander line as nearly as conveniently
may be at high water mark.12 4  In practice they frequently are
run far inland.r'2  Granted that these deviations from high water
mark exist, nevertheless, in the absence of evidence showing the
location of high water mark, the meander line may be presumed
to coincide with high water mark.' 2  As time goes on, it will
123Kehr v. Snyder, (1885) 114 Ill. 313, 2 N. E. 68, 55 Am. Rep. 866;
Batchelder v. Keniston, (1872) 51 N. H. 496, 12 Am. Rep. 143; Deerfield
v. Arms. (1855) 17 Pick. (Mass.) 41, 28 Am. Dec. 276; Patton, Titles
(1938) 277.
l"-Manual of Instructions (1930 Ed.) 216 et seq.2 See Everson v. City of Waseca, (1890) 44 Minn. 247, 46 N. W.
405; Hanson v. Rice, (1903) 88 Minn. 273, 92 N. W. 982; Gardner v.
Green, (1937) 67 N. D. 268, 271 N. W. 775; Olson v. Thorndike, (1899)
76 Minn. 399, 79 N. V. 399.
1261n the Matter of County Ditch No. 67, Murray County, (1922) 151
Minn, 292, 186 N. W. 711; Gardner v. Green, (1937) 67 N. D. 268, 271
N. W. 775.
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be easier to find the government meander line than original high
water mark as it existed at the time of the government survey.127
Wherever there is a marked departure of the meander line from
high water mark, the intersection of the upland boundary extend-
ed with high water mark ought tc be the point of beginning of the
lateral boundaries in the bed. 12s The cases last cited illustrate
graphically the considerable difference that may result between
taking the meander line and taking high water mark as the point
of beginning of the lateral boundary line in the bed. In particu-
lar cases, taking the meander corner as the point of beginning
may deprive a riparian owner of fast land .1 21
As has been indicated, the rules and methods used for running
the lateral lines in the beds of private streams are equally applic-
able to navigable streams. Under the Minnesota rule the limit
of absolute riparian ownership'on navigable waters is high water
mark, with a qualified ownership to low water mark. The point or
line of navigability will mark the outside limit of the privilege
of private use and occupation. In navigable waters, the lateral
lines in the bed will mark the bounds within which, subject to
state or federal regulation and permission, the riparian owner
may build wharves and piers, or fill in the bed. Likewise these
lateral lines will determine whether an accretion or reliction be-
longs to one riparian owner or to his neighbor.
Lake beds furnish more troublesome problems than stream
beds, as will be seen. As in the case of unmeandered streams, so
unmeandered marshes, swamps, ponds, and lakes give the least
trouble if courts will only bear in mind the difference in result
between meandered and unmeandered waters. The difference
should be obvious, but the errors and troubles courts have fallen
127The field notes may indicate the extent of the deviation of the
meander line from high water mark. Manual of Instructions (1930 Ed.)
p. 219. In that case, of course, high water mark may be determined
from the field notes.
12 Menasha Wooden-Ware Co. v. Lawson, (1888) 70 Wis. 600, 36
N. W. 412; Clark v. Campau, (1869) 19 Mich. 325; City of Peoria v.
Central National Bank, (1906) 224 III. 43, 79 N. E. 296, 12 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 687; Gardner v. Green, (1937) 67 N. D. 268, 271 N. W. 775. The
suggestion in this case that the projection of the upland boundary should
stop at the section line is rejected in Minnesota, Hanson v. Rice. (1903)
88 Minn. 2/3, 92 N. W. 982, and is not widely followed. Where by
the state rule absolute title extends to low water mark, that mark should
be the point of beginning of the lateral lines in the bed.
'
2 That would seem to be true of the owner of lot 1 sec. 20 and the
owner of lot 11 sec. 18 in Scheifert v. Briegel, (1903) 90 Minn. 125,
96 N. W. 44, 101 Am. St. Rep. 399., The court's solution at these points
seems arbitrary.
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into indicate a want of understanding which justifies the use of
some space in expounding the obvious. The effect of meandering
has been stated. It makes sections and subdivisions thereof
fractional. The meandered waters are the water boundaries of
these fractional subdivisions according to the government surveys,
field notes, and plats. When wet or water-covered lands are not
meandered, it means that the government survey lines have been
run through and across such waters. The government survey lines
do not run to or stop at a meander line or run to or stop at the
water's edge. The field notes and plats do not show fractional sub-
divisions. They show regular government survey subdivisions.
The area covered by such unmeandered waters is not excluded
from the amount paid for when the United States patents lands
embracing unmeandered waters. The land embraced within the
survey lines as shown on the official plats is all conveyed as so
much land. The plats show to a demonstration that the waters
are not a boundary, and that land within straight east-and-west
and north-and-south survey lines has been conveyed as such.
The boundary lines are straight through and across such waters.
It should be borne in mind that "the government survey
creates, not merely identifies, sections of land."' 30  The general
rule is that the government plats and field notes are conclusive as
to the location of boundaries.' 1 1 When the United States govern-
ment, or others, convey such lands with reference to the United
States surveys and plats, the plat is a part of the description and
it binds all parties, including the government, as to the boundaries
of the land thus described to the same extent as if the descriptive
data of the plat were incorporated at length in the description.' 2
A description with reference to the United States surveys and
plats is but a description by recorded metes and bounds. Obviously,
then, the lateral lines into or through such unmeandered waters
must be straight continuations of the government subdivision
lines.133  The better cases so hold. 34  Certain decisions of the
-soSawyer v. Gray, (W.D. Wash. 1913) 205 Fed. 160; Cox v. Hart,
(1922) 260 U. S. 427, 43 Sup. Ct. 154, 67 L. Ed. 332.
'13 Cases are cited in 1 Dunnell's Digest (2d ed. 1927) sees. 1077,
1079; 43 U. S. C. A., sees. 751, 752, and see the many cases cited in the
annotations thereto.13
*-Lamprey v. Mead, (1893) 54 Minn. 290, 299, 55 N. W. 1132;
40 Am. St. Rep. 328; Gary Land Co. v. Greisel, (1913) 179 Ind. 204, 100
N. E. 673; Patton, Titles (1938) sec. 65.
13 3No one would dispute this with reference to small puddles and
duck ponds crossed by government subdivision lines. The reason extends to
unmeandered waters generally.
'
34Lamprey v. Danz, (1902) 86 Minn. 317, 90 N. W. 578; City of
Albert Lea v. Nielsen, (1900) 80 Minn. 101, 82 N. W. 1104, 81 Am. St.
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Wisconsin supreme court seem contra. 35 The Wisconsin deci-
sions, however, rest on the premise that the waters in question
were navigable waters, and that therefore the state has title to the
beds. The court makes no point of the date of the patent from
the United States, whether it was issued before or after statehood.
If the waters in question were in fact navigable according to the
federal test at the date of statehood and the United States patents
were issued after statehood, then, to be sure, the state of Wisconsin
had title to the beds and the United States could not convey them
to anyone thereafter. It is submitted, however, that on the facts
stated in the cases cited, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
sustain a finding of navigability according to the federal test, and
that if the land owners concerned litigate that issue in the federal
courts, the state of Wisconsin will have to revise its views on
this issue.
It is, of course, possible that by reason of palpable mistake
or fraudulent surveys, waters navigable by the federal test may
not be meandered. Surveys and plats may show land where such
waters exist.1 6 Thus in a case 87 involving a fraudulent survey
of lands lying in Minnesota, 38 the United States Supreme Court
quotes from the lower court's findings of fact as follows:
"Southerly and westerly of said Cedar Island Lake [the lake
in issue in the case] are five other deep, navigable, and permanent
lakes in the same township, none of which are shown by the field
notes of Howe's survey or upon said government official plat of
Rep. 242; Wilton v. Van Hessen, (1911) 249 Ill. 182, 94 N. E. 134;
Edwards v. Ogle, (1881) 76 Ind. 302; Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett,(Tex. Civ. App. 1935) 88 S. W. (2d) 127; Kirkpatrick v. Yates Ice Co.,
(1891) 45 Mo. App. 335 (dictum). See also Chan v. Brandt, (1890) 45
Minn. 93, 47 N. W. 461; Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, (1862) 36 Barb. (N.Y.)
102; Linthicum v. Shipley, (1922) 140 Md. 96, 116 Atl. 871, 23 A. L. R.
754; Kilgo v. Cook, (1927) 174 Ark. 432, 295 S. W. 355; State v. New,
(1917) 280 Il. 393, 117 N. E. 597.
The rule of the text is also supported in (1926) Minnesota Attorney
General Report, opinion No. 187 in which the owner of three forties partly in
an unmeandered lake which extended beyond his lands was advised "that if
the lake is not meandered he may lawfully fence on the lines of the land
which he owns."
"35Munro v. Meilke, (1929) 200 Wis. 107, 227 N. W. 394. (Title to
islands only in issue. The court seems to assume the bed belonged to
the state) ; Baker v. Voss, (1935) 217 Wis. 415, 259 N. W. 413; Angelo
v. Railroad Commission, (1928) 19Z. Wis. 543, 217 N. W. 570.
lSGThis would be the converse of such cases as Jeems Bayou Fishing
& Hunting Club v. United States, (1922) 260 U. S. 561, 43 Sup. Ct. 205,
67 L. Ed. 402; and Security Land & Exploration Co. v. Burns, (1904)
193 U. S. 167, 24 Sup. Ct. 425, 48 L. Ed. 662, and cases therein cited.
187Kirwan v. Murphy, (1903) 189 U. S. 35, 23 Sup. Ct. 599, 47
L. Ed. 698.
28sThe same survey was in issue in Security Land & Exploration Co.
v. Burns, (1904) 193 U. S. 167, 24 Sup. Ct. 425, 48 L. Ed. 662.E7.
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said township, and all of which have, since the making of said
official plat, been sold and patented by the government as land
according to said plat."
Since the fraudulent survey was made after statehood, the patents
in question with reference to the survey and plats must have been
made after statehood. If the statement of the navigability of the
unnoted and unplatted lakes means that they were navigable ac-
cording to the federal test of navigability, the federal government
could no longer convey the beds of these lakes. They would
belong to the state. Had the patents been made before statehood,
other questions would arise.
The fact that unmeandered waters are not a boundary of any-
thing so far as the United States surveys and plats are concerned
does not prevent such waters from being made a boundary in
private conveyances. If they are, they become a monument, and
an unqualified call for such waters as a monument would, as in
all cases of a call for a monument, mean the center thereof. If
a boundary is specified as running along the line of such waters,
it will mean the thread of the stream or center line of such
waters.239 Such calls should not affect the direction of the side
lines into such waters, however. Unless otherwise stated in the
description, the upland side line should run in a straight line into
the unmeandered waters for the purely practical reason of main-
taining consistency with the government surveys with reference
to which most conveyances are made. There is, of course, nothing
to prevent a land owner from limiting his grant as he will. He
may convey all, or none, or any part of the bed underlying waters
by boundaries of his own choosing, so long as he owns what he
purports to convey.1
4 0
There remain for consideration meandered lakes. Most of the
following discussion concerning points and lines in such lakes
applies equally whether the lakes are navigable or non-navigable.
In the case of navigable lakes the lines will delimit the areas
within which the riparian owners can exercise exclusive riparian
rights and privileges. In the case of non-navigable lakes, the lines
will mark the ambit of absolute ownership of the several riparian
owners. In the case of navigable lakes, as in streams, we must
find a point or line of navigability, marking the exterior limit of
139Bauman v. Barendregt, (1930) 251 Mich. 70, 231 N. W. 70.140Den v. Wright, (C.C. N.Y. 1813) 1 Peters C. C. 64 is an old but
interesting case on this obvious point. Also Oklahoma v. Texas (1922)
258 U. S. 574, 594, 42 Sup. Ct. 406, 66 L. Ed. 771.
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exclusive riparian rights and privileges.1 41  In the case of non-
navigable lakes such a point or line does not exist.
The two matters of greatest importance here are the point
of beginning of the lateral lines into the bed, and the direction or
angle of the lateral lines. Here as in the case of meandered
streams, the shore point of beginning of the lateral line should be
the intersection of the upland side line with high water mark.
Usually that will mean high water mark as it existed at the time
of the United States government survey. In the absence of evi-
dence as to its locus, the meander line may be presumed to coin-
cide with high water mark. In most of the Minnesota cases, the
shore point of beginning has been the intersection of the .upland
side line with the meander line.'42 Our court has commented on
the fact that meander lines sometimes are run at a considerable
distance from the high water mark. 43 It admits that generally
the meander line is not a boundary line and that the water is.14
Hence, as has been pointed out, the upland side line runs straight
to the water or high water mark. Even if it is assumed that prima
facie the meander line coincides with high water mark, evidence
is admissible to show it does not. 45
If a shown departure of the meander line from high water
mark is ignored and the lateral line into the lake bed begins its
deflection inland from high water mark, the result is to deprive
the riparian owner of fast land which he owns absolutely.140 The
141What has heretofore bean said on this point applies to all navigable
waters. It will not be repeated here.
1
42 Shell v. Matteson, (1900) 81 Minn. 38, 83 N. W. 491 (from the
shore or meander line. As to the meaning of "shore," see In re Petition
of Schaller, (1935) 193 Minn. 604, 259 N. W. 529, 826. Here probably
intended as synonymous with meander line or high water mark); Hanson
v. Rice, (1903) 88 Minn. 273, 92 N. W. 982 (meander line) ; Scheifert v.
Briegel, (1903) 90 Minn. 125, 96 N. W. 44, 101 Am. St. Rep. 399 (mar-
ginal line with arbitrary and unjustified exceptions specified as to some
tracts) ; Markusen v. Mortenson, (1908) 105 Minn. 10, 116 N. W. 1021(meander line) ; Burton v. Isaacson, (1913) 122 Minn. 483, 142 N. W.
925 ("From the established corners," meaning no doubt meander corners.
In this case the court erroneously directed the upland boundaries to be
extended in a straight line. The point of beginning would then be of no
consequence, and the angle of approach of the upland boundary would be
decisive) ; Rooney v. County of Stearns, (1915) 130 Minn. 176, 153 N. W.
858 ("Ordinary high water mark-that is the meander line").
'
43Everson v. Waseca, (1890) 44 Minn, 247, 46 N. W. 405; Hanson v.
Rice, (1903) 88 Minn, 273, 92 N. W. 982; Olson v. Thorndike, (1899)
76 Minn. 399, 79 N. W. 399.
'
44Fitzpatrick v. Berthel, (1929) 176 Minn. 512, 223 N. W. 767.
A multitude of cases are to the same effect.
143In the Matter of County Ditch No. 67, Murray County, (1922)
151 Minn, 292, 186 N. W. 711.
I4-See note 128 supra and text passim.
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arbitrary points of beginning taken by the court in Schiefert v.
Briegel, 4 7 to accomplish a supposed equity between neighboring
riparian owners is quite inexcusable. Each acquired his land
according to boundaries marked on the government survey plats
and with reference to its situation on the water. Those facts
should be controlling. The court's action was as arbitrary as
would be a decree that set a section line over because one section
as surveyed contained better land than did its neighbor. It is
submitted that while the Minnesota cases sustain placing the point
of beginning at the intersection of the upland boundary with the
meander line, they do not preclude placing it at the intersection
of the upland boundary with high water mark as it existed at the
time of the United States government survey. That is where it
should be.
The direction and termini of the lateral lines in the bed de-
pend on the form of the meandered lake. If the lake is substan-
tially round, the geographical center of the lake will be the com-
mon terminus of the lateral boundaries of all the riparian owners
on the lake. 48 This is sometimes graphically described as the
pie-cutting method of apportioning the bed. The center should
be found with reference to original high water mark, or the
meander line, whichever is taken as marking the shore point of
beginning of the laterals into the bed.
If the lake is long or irregular, the direction and termini of
the lateral lines in the bed are determined by applying the stream
formula through the body of the lake and the round lake formula
in the arcs at the ends and in the larger bays and coves. Thus the
lateral lines at the ends will converge to foci that are the geo-
graphical center of the arcs at the ends. Larger bays and coves
may be treated as if they were independent small lakes."49
Through the body of the lake, a thread of the stream is found
at the geographical center line of the lake. The laterals in this
part of the bed are then run to the thread of the stream from the
intersection of the upland boundary with the meander line, or
better, high water mark, and at right angles to the thread of the
147(1903) 90 Minn. 125, 96 N. W. 44, 101 Am. St. Rep. 399.148Markuson v. Mortenson, (1908) 105 Minn. 10, 116 N. W. 1021;
Scheifert v. Briegel, (1903) 90 Minn. 125, 96 N. W. 44, 101 Am. St. Rep.
399 (the above two cases contain good plats illustrating the method);
Hanson v. Rice, (1903) 88 Minn, 273, 92 N. W. 982; Shell v. Matteson,
(1900) 81 Minn. 38, 83 N. W. 491.
340This is illustrated in Scheifert v. Briegel, (1903) 90 Minn. 125, 96
N. W. 44, 101 Am. St. Rep. 399, although here the bay or cove was part
of a substantially round lake.
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stream opposite. 5° If the lake is non-navigable, each riparian
owner will own that part of the bed lying between his upland
and the thread of the stream or center of the lake and between the
lateral lines thus run in the bed. If the lake is navigable, each
riparian owner may exercise his exclusive riparian privileges be-
tween the lateral lines thus run and the point or line of navigability.
If a navigable lake gradually and permanently dries up,15 each
riparian owner will severally own the bed divided as stated
exactly as if the lake had been a private lake'5 2 from the beginning,
subject to such changes as the law of accretion may produce. The
lateral lines will determine whether accretion or reliction belong
to one riparian owner or another.
It now becomes necessary to muddy the waters by further
consideration of the law of accretion. The law of accretion
applies to meandered waters, navigable and non-navigable. 153 The
absolute ownership of the beds of non-navigable waters implies
fixed boundaries. But by reason of the law of accretion, the
points and lines heretofore indicated are fixed in theory only in
the same sense as the thread of a stream (being a boundary) is a
fixed boundary. In fact such water boundaries change under the
force of the law of accretion.15
4
How the law of accretion operates to shift the points and lines
in water beds is easily demonstrated by reverting again to the
250 Rooney v. County of Stearns, (1915) 130 Minn. 176, 153 N. W.
858 (an illustrative plat is included in the opinion) ; Calkins v. Hart, (1916)
219 N. Y. 145, 113 N. E. 785. See also Hardin v. Jordan, (1S91) 140
U. S. 371, 11 Sup. Ct. 808, 35 L. Ed. 428. Contra, and clearly wrong for
reasons stated ante note 109 and text passim, Burton v. Isaacson, (1913)
122 Minn. 483, 142 N. W. 925.
151 Temporary recession of the waters, even though a lake dries up
entirely for a time, does not destroy the lake, or give title to its bed by
the law of accretion and reliction, at least if it is restored by natural causes.
Troska v. Brecht, (1918) 140 Minn. 233, 167 N. W. 1042, in which the
court seems to regard the term "meandered lake" as synonymous with
"navigable lake." See also Hildebrand v. Knapp, (1937) 65 S. D. 414,
274 N. W. 821, 112 A. L. R. 1104.
'520ur court has indicated that a navigable lake (according to the state
rule at least) may cease to be a public and become a private lake by reason
of the permanent lowering of the waters. Shell v. Matteson, (1900) 81
Minn. 38, 83 N. W. 491.
25BLamprey v. State, (1892) 52 Minn. 181, 53 N. W. 1139, 38 Am. St.
Rep. 541, 18 L. R. A. 670; Webber v. Axtell, (1905) 94 Minn. 375, 102
N. W. 915, 6 L. R. A. (N.S.) 194; Warren v. Chambers, (1867) 25 Ark.
120, 4 Am. Rep. 25. The rule is not the same in all states. See Patton,
Titles (1938) sec. 170.
154E. g., see Webber v. Axtell, (1905) 94 Minn. 375, 102 N. W. 915,
6 L. R. A. (N.S.) 194; Sherwin v. Bitzer, (1906) 97 Minn. 252, 106
N. W. 1046; Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., (1890) 134 U. S. 178,
10 Sup. Ct. 518, 33 L. Ed. 872.
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round, meandered, non-navigable lake. Beginning with this lake
in its original state, the lines in the bed run as before stated from
the intersection of the upland boundary lines with high water
mark (or the meander line in the absence of other evidence of high
water mark) to the geographical center of the lake. If the bed
of the lake is a perfect inverted cone, the recession of the waters
will be uniform at all points, and the last of the water will dis-
appear at the original geographical center of the lake. In such
a case, the points and lines will remain as originally run. But
such a lake would probably be unique. If the bed of the lake is a
steep declivity on one side and has a gentle slope on the other, the
horizontal recession of the waters will be slight on the steep slope
and much greater on the gentle slope. The center of the lake will
shift accordingly. The riparian owners on the side having a
gentle slope may find their relicted lands crossing the original
geographical center of the lake while water still intervenes be-
tween them and the riparian owners on the other side. The
fundamental reason underlying the law of accretion is that a
riparian owner shall maintain his right of access to the water over
his own land, not by way of easement over the land of another.155
According to this reason, the ultimate boundary between opposite
riparians is where their accretions or relictions meet-where the
last of the intervening water disappears.' 50
This being so, it will be seen that as the center of our round
lake shifts, the lateral lines in the bed must shift with it. This
is easily illustrated by drawing a circle with lines from the circum-
ference to the center, and then drawing lines from the same points
on the circumference to a point off center in the circle. Similar
shifts of the foci and the thread of the stream or lake result from
the uneven horizontal recession of the waters in long and irregular
lakes. The lateral lines in the body of the lake may or may not
remain the same, but the foci at the ends and in bays, and the lines
converging there, and the thread of the lake are almost certain to
shift as the waters recede. If the lines in the bed are determined
from time to time while the lake is drying up, the laterals in the
bed are not likely to be straight lines, but will deflect in keeping
with the contour of the bed. The ultimate exterior boundary in
the bed will be the last water line. In other words, the points and
'
55Lamprey v. State, (1892) 52 Minn. 181, 53 N. W. 1139, 38 Am.
St. Rep. 541, 18 L. R. A. 670.
156Buse v. Russell, (1885) 86 Mo. 209; Bigelow v. Hoover, (1892) 85
Iowa 161, 52 N. W. 124; 1 R. C. L. p. 248; Patton, Titles (1938) sec. 173.
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lines in the beds of waters, as found at a particular time, are
subject to such change as the law of accretion from time to time
may effect.'
5 7
The Minnesota supreme court has not paid much attention to
this aspect of the law of accretion. It has not required proof of
the configuration of the bed to determine how it was laid bare.
Sub silentio it seems to assume that lake beds have a uniform
slope from all points to the original geographical center-at least
in the absence of evidence to the contrary. If this is supposed to
be a presumption, it would seem to be contrary to well known facts.
Possible explanations of this slight regard for the law of accretion
in the Minnesota decisions are: First, the question of apportion-
ment of lake beds has commonly arisen after the bed had been
-wholly or nearly all laid bare. If actions had been brought from
time to time while the waters were going down, the boundaries
fixed might have been more in accord with the contours of the
bed.15 8 When the matter first comes up after the waters are all
gone, the beds look like a windiall or manna from heaven and it
seems equitable and is certainly easier to divide it up in proportion
to original frontage. Second, this solution is invited by the cir-
cumstance that the parties seem not to have adduced any evidence
of contour lines in the bed. The- court has not said that such
evidence would be disregarded if it were produced. It has
suggested that such evidence might be material.'"5 If the parties
who would be benefited by such evidence and relief based on it
do not produce the evidence and ask for the relief, the court has
not seen fit to insist that they must. Third, the court has dubbed
its solution as "equitable.!" Subconsciously, -this adjective has
'57Even interstate water boundaries are subject to change by the
law of accretion. E. g., see Nebraska v. Iowa, (1892) 143 U. S. 359,
12 Sup. Ct. 396, 36 L. Ed. 186.
' 
5 Hanson v. Rice, (1903) 88 Minn. 273, 92 N. W. 982; Webber v.
Axtell, (1905) 94 Minn. 375, 102 N. W. 915, 6 L. R. A. (N.S.) 194; Scheifert
v. Briegel, (1903) 90 Minn. 125, 96 N. W. 44, 101 Am. St. Rep. 399;
and Rooney v. County of Stearns, (1915) 130 Minn. 176, 153 N. W. 858,
are cases in which the court mentions the possible effect of the law of accre-
tion on boundary lines.
'
59Scheifert v. Briegel, (1903) 90 Minn. 125, 96 N. W. 44, 101 Am.
St. Rep. 399 and see the other cases cited in note 124 supra.
16oSee Scheifert v. Briegel, (1903) 90 Minn. 125, 96 N. W. 44, 101
Am. St. Rep. 399. Equitable considerations may well control the choice
of one formula for division as against another, and the location of foci in
long or irregular lakes. It cannot justify what was done in the case above
cited. It cannot justify treating fast land between the meander line and
high water mark-land never part of the lake bed-as subject to the law
of accretion and reliction as was done in the case above cited. It is true
that riparian owners on meandered waters own the land lying between
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probably operated as an effective epithetical argument for a divi-
sion of the bed between the riparian owners in proportion to the
spread of the handhold each seemed to have on it. However,
equity should follow the law. The law does not give effect to
all the possible serpentine vagaries of accretion and reliction. 161
Practical considerations require that the boundary lines leave the
bounded lands usable so far as possible. 1 2 One must assume that
each riparian owner acquired his riparian lands with reference to
its physical situation on the waters. If the physical situation of
A's land on a lake gives him a legal advantage in the bed of the
abutting lake over other riparian owners in view of their physical
situation, it is not just to deprive him of it under the guise of
equitable apportionment. For example, according to the law of
accretion, a riparian owner is entitled to follow the water as it
recedes, over his own land, to the point or line where it finally
disappears. If the land to that point or line is his by the law
of accretion, there is no warrant in law or equity for fixing his
boundary line anywhere except where the relictions of opposite and
neighboring riparians finally met. In fixing points and lines in
meandered lakes, it seems one must begin with the lake in its
original condition, that is, as of the time of the original govern-
ment survey, and fix the points and lines according to the formulae
heretofore discussed. These lines will be fixed lines, in theory
delimiting the absolute ownership in the bed of non-navigable
lakes and delimiting the area within which exclusive riparian
privileges may be exercised in navigable lakes. These points and
lines, however, are subject to such changes as the law of accre-
tion through the reliction of the waters will ultimately produce.163
the meander line and the water "precisely the same as accretions and
relictions," as stated in Hanson v. Rice, (1903) 88 Minn. 273, 92 N. W.
982. That statement can, however, easily be misunderstood. In the case
of navigable lakes, the abutting riparian owner acquired title in the bed by
the law of accretion, not so of the abutting fast land. In the case of non-
navigable lakes, the riparian owners have title to the bed by the terms
or construction of the conveyance, but the boundaries in the bed are again
in part controlled by the law of accretion which is not true of the fast land.
'
6 1Instances where the courts have refused to follow its vagaries may
be found in Waring v. Stinchcomb, (1922) 141 Md. 569, 119 Atl. 336,
32 A. L. R. 453; Crandall v. Allen, (1893) 118 Mo. 403, 24 S. W. 172, 22
L. R. A. 591; Widdicombe v. Rosemiller, (C.C. Mo. 1902) 118 Fed. 295.
162Cases on apportionment of alluvion are collected in 21 L. R. A. 776,
25 L. R. A. (N.S.) 257, L. R. A. 1917B 786.
163Since the physical situation at the shore point of the lateral line
between coterminous owners will be the same, the greatest change will be
in the body of the lake. The exterior point or line in the lake will be
affected most.
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When the question of boundaries first comes up after the lake has
wholly disappeared, the contour lines of the bed should not be
disregarded but should be given effect.'
164Clark, Surveying and Boundaries, (2d ed. 1939) ch. 15, contains a
valuable discussion of many cases from divers jurisdictions concerning
points and lines in lakes, streams, and tidewaters. The various formulae
applied are discussed and illustrated. Clearly in many cases, the courts
were making ad hoc decisions while blindly searching for a just and
workable rule of general application. Consultation with a group of expert
surveyors- might assist the courts in formulating such a rule, an end as
desirable with reference to riparian land titles as certain rules of law are
desirable with reference to all titles.
